Standard liberal theories of justice rest on the assumption that only those beings that hold the capacity for moral personality (CMP) have moral status and therefore are right-holders. As many pointed out, this has the disturbing implication of excluding a wide range of entities from the scope of justice. Call this the under-inclusiveness objection. This paper provides a response to the under-inclusiveness objection and illustrates its implications for liberal theories of justice. In particular, the paper defends two claims: first, it argues that both the CMP and the potential capacity for moral personality (PCMP) are bases of moral status. This pluralist account of the basis of moral status can broaden the scope of justice and provide a solid philosophical justification for the common-sense intuition that almost all human beings have a moral status that is different and superior to that of nonhuman animals. Second, contra what is commonly suggested, it contends that potential and actual moral persons have different and unequal rights, other things being equal.

中文翻译：

---

对道德地位基础的多元解释

标准的自由主义正义理论基于这样一个假设，即只有那些具有道德人格能力 (CMP) 的人才有道德地位，因此才是权利持有者。正如许多人指出的那样，这具有将各种实体排除在司法范围之外的令人不安的含义。将此称为包容性不足的反对意见。本文对包容性不足的反对意见作出回应，并说明其对自由主义正义理论的影响。特别是，该论文捍卫了两个主张：首先，它认为 CMP 和潜在的道德人格能力 (PCMP) 都是道德地位的基础。这种对道德地位基础的多元解释可以拓宽正义的范围，并为几乎所有人类的道德地位都不同于非人类动物的道德地位这一常识性直觉提供坚实的哲学依据。第二，与通常的建议相反，它认为潜在的和实际的道德人拥有不同的和不平等的权利，其他条件是平等的。