A question, long discussed by legal scholars, has recently provoked a considerable amount of philosophical attention: ‘Is it ever appropriate to base a legal verdict on statistical evidence alone?’ Many philosophers who have considered this question reject legal reliance on bare statistics, even when the odds of error are extremely low. This paper develops a puzzle for the dominant theories concerning why we should eschew bare statistics. Namely, there seem to be compelling scenarios in which there are multiple sources of incriminating statistical evidence. As we conjoin together different types of statistical evidence, it becomes increasingly incredible to suppose that a positive verdict would be impermissible. I suggest that none of the dominant views in the literature can easily accommodate such cases, and close by offering a diagnosis of my own.

中文翻译：

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法律证明和统计连接

一个由法律学者长期讨论的问题最近引起了相当多的哲学关注：“仅根据统计证据做出法律裁决是否合适？” 许多考虑过这个问题的哲学家拒绝在法律上依赖单纯的统计数据，即使错误的几率极低。本文为有关为什么我们应该避免裸统计的主流理论提出了一个难题。也就是说，似乎有令人信服的场景，其中有多种来源的统计证据有罪。当我们将不同类型的统计证据结合在一起时，假设肯定的判决是不被允许的就变得越来越令人难以置信。我认为文献中的主流观点都不能轻易适应这种情况，