Remembering and forgetting are the two poles of the memory system. Consequently, any approach to memory should be able to explain both remembering and forgetting in order to gain a comprehensive and insightful understanding of the memory system. Can an enactive approach to memory processes do so? In this article I propose a possible way to provide a positive answer to this question. In line with some current enactive approaches to memory, I suggest that forgetting –similarly to remembering– might be constituted within an embodied and active process. Within this process, some simulation and re-enactment paths would acquire more relevance than others. This acquired relevance would make the activation of other paths of recall less likely, thus preventing the memory system from engaging in some episodic simulations. These changes in the likelihood of activation of some paths of recall –the forgotten ones– can be accounted for in an enactive fashion by studying both “internal” and “external” re-enactment and simulation paths. With regard to the latter, I propose to examine the process of forgetting by considering the engagement and affective relation of an embodied agent with her field of affordances. I suggest that, in the case of emotion-laden memories, the agent’s decoupling from some affordances of the environment might contribute to the process of forgetting, in that it would reduce the agent’s opportunities for situated episodic simulations.

记忆和遗忘是记忆系统的两个极点。因此，任何记忆方法都应该能够解释记忆和遗忘，以便对记忆系统有一个全面而深刻的理解。记忆过程的主动方法可以这样做吗？在本文中，我提出了一种可能的方法来为这个问题提供肯定的答案。与当前的一些生成性记忆方法一致，我建议遗忘——类似于记忆——可能是在一个具身和主动的过程中构成的。在这个过程中，一些模拟和重演路径将比其他路径获得更多的相关性。这种获得的相关性将使其他回忆路径的激活不太可能，从而阻止记忆系统参与一些情景模拟。通过研究“内部”和“外部”重演和模拟路径，可以以主动方式解释某些回忆路径（被遗忘的路径）激活可能性的这些变化。关于后者，我建议通过考虑具身代理人与她的可供性领域的参与和情感关系来研究遗忘的过程。我建议，在充满情感的记忆的情况下，代理与环境的某些可供性脱钩可能会导致遗忘过程，因为它会减少代理进行情景情景模拟的机会。我建议通过考虑具身代理与她的可供性领域的参与和情感关系来检查遗忘的过程。我建议，在充满情感的记忆的情况下，代理与环境的某些可供性脱钩可能会导致遗忘过程，因为它会减少代理进行情景情景模拟的机会。我建议通过考虑具身代理与她的可供性领域的参与和情感关系来检查遗忘的过程。我建议，在充满情感的记忆的情况下，代理与环境的某些可供性脱钩可能会导致遗忘过程，因为它会减少代理进行情景情景模拟的机会。