This paper focuses on the connection between meaning, the specific field of phenomenological philosophy, and mattering, the cornerstone of personal identity. Doing so requires that we take a stand on the scope and method of phenomenological philosophy itself. I will argue that while we can describe our lives in an “impersonal” way, such descriptions will necessarily omit what makes it the case that such lives can matter at all. This will require distinguishing between “personal” identity and “self” identity, an idea well-established in the phenomenological literature – for instance, in Husserl’s distinction between the “transcendental ego” and the person -- but I will argue that self-identity is a normative achievement whose clarification requires a move into second-person phenomenology. The argument moves through three sections. First, I will discuss Aron Gurwitsch’s “non-egological” conception of consciousness and will explain the most important reason Husserl rejected this view in his transcendental phenomenology. Second, I will discuss some contemporary approaches to Husserl’s distinction between person and ego (personal identity and self identity). Third, I will argue that these approaches testify to an ambiguity in Husserl’s account of being “true” to oneself that requires us to understand selfhood as having the structure Heidegger called care. The importance of this will be demonstrated phenomenologically in a critical examination of Paul Ricoeur’s ontology of selfhood, particularly his interpretation of the second-person phenomenology of conscience.

本文着重于意义，现象学哲学的特定领域和重要的问题（个人身份的基石）之间的联系。这样做要求我们站在现象学哲学本身的范围和方法上。我将争辩说，尽管我们可以用“非个人”的方式描述我们的生活，但这样的描述必然会忽略使这种生活完全重要的情况。这将需要区分“个人”身份和“自我”身份，这是现象学文献中公认的一个观念，例如，在胡塞尔对“先验自我”和人的区分中，但是我将主张自我身份是规范性的需要澄清的成就，需要转向第二人称现象学。该论点分为三个部分。首先，我将讨论阿伦·古维茨（Aron Gurwitsch）的“非论证”意识观，并解释胡塞尔在其先验现象学中拒绝该观点的最重要原因。其次，我将讨论胡塞尔区分人与自我（人的身份和自我身份）的一些当代方法。第三，我将争辩说，这些方法证明了胡塞尔对自己“真实”的说法的含糊不清，这要求我们将自我理解理解为海德格尔称之为护理的结构。保罗·里科（Paul Ricoeur）关于自我的本体论的批判性检验将在现象学上证明这一点的重要性，