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Rejecting Dreyfus’ introspective ‘phenomenology’. The case for phenomenological analysis
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences ( IF 2.0 ) Pub Date : 2020-07-10 , DOI: 10.1007/s11097-020-09687-x
Alexander A. Jeuk

I argue that Hubert Dreyfus’ work on embodied coping, the intentional arc, solicitations and the background as well as his anti-representationalism rest on introspection. I denote with ‘introspection’ the methodological malpractice of formulating ontological statements about the conditions of possibility of phenomena merely based on descriptions. In order to illustrate the insufficiencies of Dreyfus’ methodological strategy in particular and introspection in general, I show that Heidegger, to whom Dreyfus constantly refers as the foundation of his own work, derives ontological statements about the conditions of possibility of phenomena not merely from descriptions, but also from analyses. I further show that deriving ontological statements directly from descriptions entails implausible results. I do so by discussing representative cases. Based on these general methodological considerations, I show that Dreyfus’ work on action, skill and understanding is introspective. First, I demonstrate that Dreyfus’ influential claim that rules and representations do not govern skillful actions is the result of introspection, because it is merely founded on the absence of rules and representations in representative descriptions of skillful actions. Second, I show that Dreyfus’ work on embodied coping, the intentional arc, solicitations and the background is also based on introspection. These ontological structures are merely reifications of descriptions and are not further substantiated by analyses.

中文翻译:

拒绝德雷福斯的内省性“现象学”。现象学分析案例

我认为,休伯特·德雷福斯(Hubert Dreyfus)在具体应对,故意弧线,拉客和背景方面的工作以及他的反代表主义都取决于内省。我用“内省”来表示仅基于描述就现象可能性条件制定本体论陈述的方法论失误。为了说明Dreyfus的方法论策略(尤其是自省)的不足之处,我表明,Dreyfus经常将其作为自己工作基础的Heidegger不仅从描述中获得了关于现象可能性条件的本体论陈述。 ,但也来自分析。我进一步证明,直接从描述中得出本体论陈述会带来令人难以置信的结果。我通过讨论代表性案例来做到这一点。基于这些一般方法上的考虑,我证明了德雷福斯在行动,技巧和理解方面的工作是内省的。首先,我证明了德雷弗斯的有说服力的主张,即规则和表示不支配熟练的行动,这是内省的结果,因为它只是建立在对熟练的动作的代表性描述中没有规则和表示的基础上。其次,我证明了德雷福斯在具体应对,故意弧线,诱使和背景方面的工作也是基于内省的。这些本体论结构仅仅是描述的具体化,而没有被分析进一步证实。我证明了德雷福斯的有说服力的主张,即规则和表示不支配熟练的行动,这是内省的结果,因为它只是建立在对熟练的动作的代表性描述中没有规则和表示的基础上。其次,我证明了德雷福斯在具体应对,故意弧线,诱使和背景方面的工作也是基于内省的。这些本体论结构仅仅是描述的具体化,而没有被分析进一步证实。我证明了德雷福斯的有说服力的主张,即规则和表示不支配熟练的行动,这是内省的结果,因为它只是建立在对熟练的动作的代表性描述中没有规则和表示的基础上。其次,我证明了德雷福斯在具体应对,故意弧线,诱使和背景方面的工作也是基于内省的。这些本体论结构仅仅是描述的具体化,而没有被分析进一步证实。
更新日期:2020-07-10
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