Assessing the scientific status of theories of consciousness is often a difficult task. In this paper, I explore the dialectic between the Integrated Information Theory (Oizumi et al. PLoS Comput Biol , 10(5), e1003588, 2014 ; Tononi et al. Nat Rev Neurosci , 17(7), 450-61 , 2016 ) and a recently proposed criticism of that theory: the ‘unfolding argument’ (Doerig et al. Consciousness and Cognition , 72, 49-59 , 2019 ). I show that the phenomenology-first approach in consciousness research can lead to valid scientific theories of consciousness. I do this by highlighting the two reasons why the unfolding argument fails: first, phenomenology-first theories are grounded, not circular. Second, falsificationism does not provide an adequate demarcation criterion in philosophy of science. I conclude that this specific debate has significance for how, in general, consciousness researchers test and criticize theories of consciousness, and how dismissing the phenomenology-first methodology in favour of a third person-based methodology means endorsing a position in philosophy of mind that has already been challenged.

中文翻译：

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意识科学中的现象学第一和第三人称方法：综合信息论和不断发展的论证的案例

评估意识理论的科学地位通常是一项艰巨的任务。在本文中，我探讨了集成信息理论之间的辩证关系（Oizumi等.PLoS Comput Biol，10（5），e1003588，2014; Tononi等.Nat Rev Neurosci，17（7），450-61，2016）最近提出的对该理论的批评：``展开论证''（Doerig等人Consciousness and Cognition，72，49-59，2019）。我证明了意识研究中的现象学优先方法可以导致有效的意识科学理论。为此，我着重强调了展开的争论失败的两个原因：首先，现象学优先的理论是扎根的，而不是循环的。其次，证伪主义在科学哲学中没有提供适当的分界标准。我得出结论，这场特定的辩论对于如何，