In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre. They argue that Husserl’s phenomenology shares similarities with computational functionalism, and the key similarity is between the concept of noema and the concept of mental representation. I show the weaknesses of that reading and argue that there is another available functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I propose to shift perspective and approach the relation between phenomenology and functionalism from a methodological perspective, specifically taking into account the functionalist explanatory strategy called functional analysis. I discuss the notion of function in Husserl’s works and Husserl’s idea of functional phenomenology. The key argument I develop is that in functional phenomenology we can find an explanatory strategy which is analogous to the strategy of functional decomposition used in functional analysis. I conclude that the proposed functionalist reading of phenomenology opens a new approach to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences.

中文翻译：

---

现象学和功能分析。功能主义的胡塞尔现象学解读

在本文中，我讨论了功能主义对胡塞尔现象学的解释。第一个是在休伯特·德雷福斯和罗纳德·麦金太尔之间的讨论中创造的。他们认为，胡塞尔的现象学与计算功能主义有相似之处，关键的相似之处在于noema概念和心理表征概念之间。我展示了该读物的弱点，并认为还有另一种实用主义的胡塞尔现象学读物。我建议从方法论的角度转移观点并探讨现象学与功能主义之间的关系，特别是考虑到称为功能分析的功能主义解释策略。我将讨论胡塞尔作品中的功能概念和胡塞尔功能现象学的思想。我提出的关键论点是，在功能现象学中，我们可以找到一种解释性策略，该策略类似于功能分析中使用的功能分解策略。我得出的结论是，拟议的功能主义现象学阅读为现象学与认知科学的整合开辟了一条新途径。