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Shaping your own mind: the self-mindshaping view on metacognition
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences ( IF 2.0 ) Pub Date : 2020-01-17 , DOI: 10.1007/s11097-020-09658-2
Víctor Fernández-Castro , Fernando Martínez-Manrique

Starting from Proust’s distinction between the self-attributive and self-evaluative views on metacognition, this paper presents a third view: self-mindshaping. Based on the notion of mindshaping as the core of social cognition, the self-mindshaping view contends that mindshaping abilities can be turned on one’s own mind. Against the self-attributive view, metacognition is not a matter of accessing representations to metarepresent them but of giving shape to those representations themselves. Against the self-evaluative view, metacognition is not blind to content but relies heavily on it. We characterize our view in terms of four issues that, according to Proust, distinguish the previous approaches, namely, whether metacognitive mechanisms are the same as those employed to access other minds, whether metacognitive control requires conceptual representation, whether metacognition is propositional, and whether metacognitive access is linked to mental action. After describing some of the mechanisms for self-mindshaping, we show how this view regards metacognition as (1) grounded on social interaction mechanisms, (2) conceptually driven, (3) possibly, but not necessarily, propositional, and (4) engaged in the practical regulation of mental states. Finally, we examine the prospects for the primacy of self-mindshaping as the primary metacognitive function. We argue that self-attributive processes typically subserve the practical goals emphasized by the mindshaping view, and that the evaluative role played by procedural metacognition can be grounded on social cues rather than on experiential feelings. Even if this is not enough to claim the primacy of self-mindshaping, it still appears as a third kind of metacognition, not reducible to the other two.

中文翻译:

塑造自己的思想:关于元认知的自我塑造观点

从普鲁斯特对元认知的自我归因和自我评价观点之间的区别开始,本文提出了第三种观点:自我思想塑造。基于思想塑造的概念是社会认知的核心,自我思想观点认为,塑造思想的能力可以由自己的思想来决定。与自我属性观点相反,元认知不是访问表示以元表示它们的问题,而是塑造那些表示本身的问题。与自我评价观点相反,元认知不是内容盲目,而是高度依赖内容。根据普鲁斯特(Proust)的观点,我们用四个问题来刻画我们的观点,普鲁斯特(Proust)区分了以前的方法,即元认知机制是否与用来进入其他思想的机制相同,元认知控制是否需要概念表示,元认知是否是命题性的以及元认知访问是否与心理行为有关。在描述了自我思维形成的一些机制之后,我们将展示这种观点如何将元认知视为:(1)基于社会互动机制,(2)概念驱动,(3)可能但不一定是命题和(4)参与在精神状态的实际调节中。最后,我们考察了将自以为是首要的元认知功能的前景。我们认为,自我归因过程通常符合思维定型观点所强调的实际目标,而程序性元认知所发挥的评价作用可以基于社会暗示,而不是基于体验。
更新日期:2020-01-17
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