With the exception of James Ostrow’s 1990 study, social sensitivity has received scarce attention in philosophy, whilst it has become an important area of research in social and clinical psychology, where it is commonly known as interpersonal sensitivity. The latter is usually understood as a form of social skill to appropriately recognise and decode the appearance and behaviour of others. However, this view suffers from conceptual limitations in that it tends to reduce social sensitivity to standardised skilful behaviour. Drawing on Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, I disambiguate social sensitivity from social skills, arguing that the former builds on the receptivity of habit to beliefs and cognitive dissonance. In this revised sense, social sensitivity informs processes of attitude change that challenge ingrained dispositions and potentially defy social codes and expectations.

除了詹姆斯·奥斯特罗 (James Ostrow) 1990 年的研究外，社会敏感性在哲学中很少受到关注，而它已成为社会和临床心理学的重要研究领域，通常被称为人际敏感性。后者通常被理解为一种社交技能，可以适当地识别和解码他人的外表和行为。然而，这种观点受到概念上的限制，因为它倾向于降低对标准化熟练行为的社会敏感性。借鉴胡塞尔的感知现象学，我将社会敏感性与社会技能区分开来，认为前者建立在习惯对信念和认知失调的接受性之上。在这种修订后的意义上，