Object-hood is central to Husserl’s work, yet he employs several different notions of object-hood without clarifying the differences; his work thus offers rich and nuanced reflections on object-hood, but in a theoretically underdeveloped, at times even paradoxical, form. This paper aims to develop Husserl’s theory of objects systematically. In order to achieve this I distinguish five object-concepts operative in Husserl’s phenomenology and prove that they are not co-extensional. I also argue that they form a layer in terms of transcendental constitution, one implying the other. I conclude the paper by exploring Husserl’s paradoxical claim that the absolute is not an object. From these considerations, two meta-phenomenological lessons emerge: (a) object-hood is not total (there are not only objects); yet (b) we cannot escape objectification while engaged in phenomenological reflection.

中文翻译：

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现象学的对象

对象罩是胡塞尔工作的核心，但是他采用了几种不同的对象罩概念，而没有弄清差异。因此，他的作品对物镜罩提供了丰富而细微的反映，但其理论上是欠发达的，有时甚至是自相矛盾的形式。本文旨在系统地发展胡塞尔的物体理论。为了实现这一目标，我区分了胡塞尔现象学中有效的五个客体概念，并证明它们不是共同延伸的。我还认为，它们构成了超越性构成的一个层次，一个隐含着另一个。在总结本文时，我探讨了胡塞尔关于绝对不是物体的悖论主张。从这些考虑出发，出现了两个元现象学的教训：（a）客体不是完全的（不仅有客体）；