Hobbes considered as unambiguous and unproblematic his demonstration in De Corpore that every effect past, present or future is necessary, since it always requires a sufficient cause that cannot be sufficient without being necessary, so that nothing is possible which will not be actual at some time. Now, this approach to necessity and possibility was received by his contemporary readers as missing its aim. Two immediate criticisms of De Corpore by Moranus and Ward exhibit from this viewpoint an interesting difference as to their common argument that only hypothetical necessity can result from Hobbes’s premises. My essay relates this argumentative difference to the absence (Moranus) or presence (Ward) in the background of the free-will dispute between Hobbes and Bramhall. From there, I examine also different interpretations of the ‘hypothetical necessity-argument’ in the indirect critical reception of De Corpore, when the target is Hobbes’s necessitarianism in the controversy with Bramhall, based on significant material from his De Corpore project. Remarkably, although Leibniz agrees with Bramhall that Hobbes only proves a hypothetical necessity, Leibniz’s understanding of hypothetical necessity is not that of Bramhall. Another striking difference is displayed in the use of the ‘hypothetical necessity-argument’ by More, which as it were blurs the connection of the free-will issue with Hobbes’s general doctrine of causality.

中文翻译：

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霍布斯关于模态的 De Corpore 及其当代批判

霍布斯认为他在 De Corpore 中的论证是明确的和没有问题的，即过去、现在或未来的每一个结果都是必要的，因为它总是需要一个充分的原因，如果没有必要，就不可能是充分的，因此在某个时间不可能成为现实. 现在，这种探讨必然性和可能性的方法被他同时代的读者认为没有达到目的。Moranus 和 Ward 对 De Corpore 的两个直接批评从这个观点展示了一个有趣的差异，即他们共同的论点，即只有假设的必然性才能从霍布斯的前提中产生。我的文章将这种争论性差异与霍布斯和布拉姆霍尔之间自由意志争议的背景中的缺席（莫拉努斯）或在场（沃德）联系起来。从那里，我还研究了对 De Corpore 的间接批判性接受中对“假设的必要性论证”的不同解释，当目标是 Hobbes 在与 Bramhall 的争论中的必然主义时，基于他的 De Corpore 项目的重要材料。值得注意的是，尽管莱布尼茨同意布拉姆霍尔的观点，即霍布斯只证明了一种假设的必然性，但莱布尼茨对假设必然性的理解与布拉姆霍尔的不同。另一个显着的不同表现在莫尔使用“假设的必然性论证”时，它似乎模糊了自由意志问题与霍布斯的一般因果关系学说之间的联系。值得注意的是，尽管莱布尼茨同意布拉姆霍尔的观点，即霍布斯只证明了一种假设的必然性，但莱布尼茨对假设必然性的理解与布拉姆霍尔的不同。另一个显着的不同表现在莫尔使用“假设的必然性论证”时，它似乎模糊了自由意志问题与霍布斯的一般因果关系学说之间的联系。值得注意的是，尽管莱布尼茨同意布拉姆霍尔的观点，即霍布斯只证明了一种假设的必然性，但莱布尼茨对假设必然性的理解与布拉姆霍尔的不同。另一个显着的不同表现在莫尔使用“假设的必然性论证”时，它似乎模糊了自由意志问题与霍布斯的一般因果关系学说之间的联系。