In this article, I show that Hobbes’s account of the generation of the commonwealth in both The Elements of Law and De Cive relies on ideas that he would come to theorise in terms of authorisation and representation in Leviathan . In this respect, I argue that the Leviathan account is better understood as filling in gaps and resolving equivocations in Hobbes’s theory, rather than marking a decisive break in his thinking. This argument is developed by substantiating two more specific theses. First, while Hobbes only explicitly distinguishes between the “alienation” and “authorisation” clauses of the covenant in Leviathan , the earlier versions of his theory rely on a two-clause account. Second, in the earlier versions of his theory, Hobbes equivocates between suggesting that the relation between the state and sovereign should be understood in terms of representation or identity; an equivocation that he would only resolve in Leviathan .

中文翻译：

---

利维坦之前的授权和代表

在这篇文章中，我展示了霍布斯在《法律要素》和《德西维》中对英联邦产生的描述所依赖的想法，他将在《利维坦》中根据授权和代表进行理论化。在这方面，我认为利维坦的解释更适合理解为填补霍布斯理论中的空白和解决模棱两可的问题，而不是标志着他思想的决定性突破。这个论点是通过证实两个更具体的论点而发展起来的。首先，虽然霍布斯在《利维坦》中只明确区分了盟约的“异化”和“授权”条款，但他的理论的早期版本依赖于两个条款的说明。其次，在他理论的早期版本中，霍布斯在建议应该从代表或身份的角度来理解国家和主权者之间的关系之间存在模棱两可的关系；一个他只能在利维坦中解决的模棱两可。