This article argues that intellectual character vices involve non-instrumental motives to oppose, antagonise, or avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves. This view has been the recent target of criticism based on alleged counterexamples presenting epistemically vicious individuals who are virtuously motivated or at least lack suitable epistemically bad motivations. The paper first presents these examples and shows that they do not undermine the motivational approach. Finally, having distinguished motivating from explanatory reasons for belief and action, it argues that our epistemic practice of vice attribution supplies evidence in favour of motivational accounts of vice.

中文翻译：

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认知恶习和动机

本文认为，智力品格的恶习涉及反对、对抗或避免本身在认知上有益的事物的非工具性动机。这种观点最近成为批评的目标，基于所谓的反例，这些反例展示了具有道德动机或至少缺乏适当的认知不良动机的认知恶性个体。本文首先介绍了这些例子，并表明它们不会破坏激励方法。最后，将动机与信念和行动的解释性原因区分开来，它认为我们对罪恶归因的认知实践提供了支持罪恶动机解释的证据。