The debate concerning epistemic contextualism represents a kind of linguistic turn in epistemology, where the focus has shifted from theorising about knowledge to theorising about knowledge attributions. Such a shift may well prove valuable, but only if we are clear on what the relationship is between a semantic analysis of knowledge attributions and a philosophical analysis of knowledge. One plausible approach is to claim that the semantic analysis entails and is entailed by the philosophical analysis. Yet this view - referred to here as the default view - has been explicitly adopted by few in the contextualism debate. This paper considers a form of argument in favour of the default view, and then considers the challenges that arise from either accepting or rejecting the default view.

中文翻译：

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认知语境主义的令人眼花缭乱的转向

关于认知语境主义的争论代表了认识论的一种语言转向，其焦点已从知识理论转向知识属性理论。这种转变很可能被证明是有价值的，但前提是我们必须清楚知识归因的语义分析和知识的哲学分析之间的关系。一种可能的方法是声称语义分析包含哲学分析并且被哲学分析包含。然而，这种观点——这里称为默认观点——在语境主义辩论中很少被明确采用。本文考虑了一种支持默认观点的论证形式，然后考虑了接受或拒绝默认观点所带来的挑战。