This article aims to assess the suitability of the concept of ‘animal dignity’ as a normative principle for the legal approach towards animals. Through an analysis of the recent debate on the applicability, meaning(s) and implications of dignity to (non-human) animals, it will defend the argument that, despite its conceptual vagueness, the concept of ‘animal dignity’ has the potential to address some of the shortcomings in the current paradigm based in animal welfare, as well as in the often proposed paradigms based in ideas of animal rights. By taking a neo-pragmatic perspective (focusing on the use rather than the exact—but impossible to pinpoint—meaning of ‘animal dignity’), it seeks to demonstrate that traces of animal dignity can already be found in positive law, e.g. in the attention given to the intrinsic legal relevance of animals and their interests. It also argues that dignity does not need to be a monolithic concept applicable in the same way to all animals, but can be adapted to species-specific needs to flourish: dignity is therefore more of a sliding scale, depending on the breadth and width of the needs of each animal species. The article concludes that introducing ‘animal dignity’ as a normative principle in the legal realm might be a desirable step towards more-than-human legalities in the Anthropocene.

中文翻译：

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动物尊严与法律：潜力、问题和可能的影响

本文旨在评估“动物尊严”概念作为法律对待动物的规范原则的适用性。通过分析最近关于尊严对（非人类）动物的适用性、含义和影响的辩论，它将捍卫这样的论点，即尽管概念模糊，“动物尊严”的概念有可能解决当前基于动物福利的范式以及经常提出的基于动物权利理念的范式中的一些缺点。通过采用新实用主义的观点（侧重于使用而不是“动物尊严”的确切含义——但无法确定——含义），它试图证明动物尊严的痕迹已经可以在实在法中找到，例如 关注动物及其利益的内在法律相关性。它还认为尊严不需要是一个单一的概念，以同样的方式适用于所有动物，但可以适应物种特定的繁荣需求：因此，尊严更多的是一个滑动的尺度，取决于动物的广度和宽度。每个动物物种的需求。文章的结论是，在法律领域引入“动物尊严”作为规范性原则可能是人类世超越人类合法性的理想步骤。