In Bostock v Clayton County (2020) Gorsuch J holds that direct discrimination because of sexual orientation is a form of direct discrimination because of sex. I argue that the same is true under the Equality Act 2010. I consider the arguments of (Finnis, in: Finnis (ed) Intention and identity: collected essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) and (Gardner in Oxf J Leg Stud 18(1):167–187, 1998) that “because of”, “on grounds of”, and similar phrases in UK discrimination legislation invoke the state of mind of the discriminator. I apply this point to Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013] arguing that (i) the UK Supreme Court was wrong to find direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, while, (ii), nevertheless, under the Equality Act 2010, that case and similar cases actually involve direct discrimination because of sex, not because of sexual orientation. I conclude by considering some objections, precedents, and implications.

中文翻译：

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性取向歧视是性别歧视的一种形式吗？

在 Bostock v Clayton County (2020) 一案中，Gorsuch J 认为由于性取向的直接歧视是一种基于性别的直接歧视。我认为根据 2010 年平等法案也是如此。我考虑了 (Finnis, in: Finnis (ed) Intention and identity: collection essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) and (Gardner in Oxf J Leg Stud 18(1):167–187, 1998)，英国歧视立法中的“因为”、“基于……”和类似的短语援引了歧视者的心理状态。我将这一点应用于 Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]，认为 (i) 英国最高法院认定基于性取向的直接歧视是错误的，而 (ii) 尽管如此，根据 2010 年平等法案，该案件和类似案件实际上涉及基于性别的直接歧视，不是因为性取向。最后，我会考虑一些反对意见、先例和影响。