In §3 of the Critique of Judgement Kant argues that if the feeling of pleasure were a sensation distinct from whatever representation gives rise to the feeling, then we would be – in the terminology of the Metaphysics of Morals – rational beings (vernünftige Wesen) but not moral beings (Vernunftwesen); we would inescapably (and blamelessly) be hedonists. I reconstruct this at first glance strange argument and suggest, first, that Kant’s actual view of pleasure is an attitudinal theory that avoids the problem of hedonism. Second, the argument of §3 is to be understood in the context of Kant’s emphasis on moral feeling and its cultivation in his writings since the Critique of Practical Reason.

中文翻译：

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康德论情感、感觉与理性与道德的差距

在§3判断力批判康德认为，如果快感是一种不同于产生这种感觉的任何表征的感觉，那么我们将是——用道德形而上学– 理性的人（语言知识) 但不是有道德的人 (警戒); 我们将不可避免地（并且无可指责地）成为享乐主义者。乍一看，我重构了这个奇怪的论点，并首先提出，康德的实际快乐观是一种避免享乐主义问题的态度理论。其次，第 3 节的论点应在康德自 2018 年以来在他的著作中强调道德情感及其培养的语境中理解。实践理性批判.