Abstract Wood (1970) convincingly argues that Kant’s notion of moral faith is a response to a “dialectical perplexity” or antinomy. Specifically, moral faith is a response to the threat of moral despair. In line with this suggestion, I make the case that moral faith is the resolution of a crisis about how to go on with one’s life in the face of the threat of moral despair. If this is right, then we have a potential solution to two related anxieties: (1) why the matter of our moral faith or despair deserves to be a topic of practical philosophy instead of empirical psychology, and (2) how despair could be a real threat even though Kant holds that rational beings could never truly lack faith. But, to fully see how these concerns can be answered, we must go beyond Wood’s initial analysis. I first argue that Kant’s philosophy suggests two kinds of moral faith: external and internal. I then argue that internal moral faith is analogous to self-contentment (Selbstzufriedenheit) in the second Critique’s practical antinomy. Together, these arguments suggest that moral faith is a response to a real threat of moral despair, and that both dialectically require one another within practical reason.

中文翻译：

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康德宗教中道德信仰的内在性

摘要伍德（1970）令人信服地指出，康德的道德信仰概念是对“辩证困惑”或对立论的回应。具体而言，道德信仰是对道德绝望威胁的回应。根据这一建议，我认为道德信仰是面对道德绝望威胁如何生存的危机的解决方案。如果这是正确的，那么我们有可能解决两个相关的焦虑：（1）为什么我们的道德信仰或绝望问题应该成为实践哲学而不是经验心理学的话题，（2）绝望如何成为现实？即使康德认为理性的人永远不会真正缺乏信仰，这仍然是一个真正的威胁。但是，要充分了解如何解决这些问题，我们必须超越伍德的初步分析。首先，我认为康德的哲学提出了两种道德信仰：外部的和内部的。然后，我认为内部道德信仰类似于第二批评论的实践对立中的自我满足（Selbstzufriedenheit）。总之，这些论点表明，道德信仰是对道德绝望的真正威胁的一种反应，并且两者在实践上都辩证地要求彼此。