Abstract In this paper, I present an interpretation of Kant’s view that reason’s hypostasis of the idea of a sum-total of reality is dogmatic and illegitimate. In the section on the ‘Transcendental Ideal’, the second section of the Ideal of Pure Reason chapter in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant starts by describing reason’s procedure from the affirmation of the principle of thoroughgoing determination to the hypostasis in question. According to the interpretation I defend, the argument for hypostasis deployed in this section constitutes an improvement upon an argument defended by the pre-critical Kant himself in his 1673 essay “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God”. By making reference to the concept of omnitudo realitatis, the argument in the ‘Transcendental Ideal’ section presents a much more radical and convincing interpretation of the thesis that ‘possibility presupposes actuality’. Second, I present transcendental idealism and its related distinction between objects of sense and objects in general as the main dissuasive argument of the critical philosopher against hypostasis. Finally, I consider an argument against hypostasis that is independent of transcendental idealism: the threat of set-theoretical paradoxes if we hypostatize the relevant idea, intended as the concept of an absolutely comprehensive totality.

中文翻译：

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上帝，神智不清和悖论的威胁：探讨康德和非康德进行视的原因

摘要在本文中，我对康德的观点进行了解释，康德认为，对现实总和的观念的理性滞后是教条式的和非法的。康德在《纯粹理性批判》的“超然理想”部分，即“纯粹理性的理想”一章的第二部分中，从描述彻底确定原则到所讨论的假设的理性过程入手。根据我所捍卫的解释，本节中关于低调的论点是对前批评的康德本人在其1673年的论文“唯一支持论证上帝存在的论点”中辩护的论点的改进。通过参考全能的概念，“先验理想”部分中的论点对“可能先于现实”的论断提出了更为激进和令人信服的解释。其次，我提出先验的唯心主义及其在感觉客体和一般客体之间的相关区分，作为批判哲学家反对假说的主要劝阻论点。最后，我考虑了一个反对假设的论点，该论点与先验的唯心主义无关：如果我们假设相关概念（绝对绝对的总体概念），那么集合理论悖论的威胁。我提出先验的唯心主义及其在感觉对象和一般对象之间的相关区分，作为批判哲学家反对假说的主要劝阻性论点。最后，我考虑了一个反对假设的论点，该论点与先验的唯心主义无关：如果我们假设相关概念（绝对绝对的总体概念），那么集合理论悖论的威胁。我提出先验的唯心主义及其在感觉对象和一般对象之间的相关区分，作为批判哲学家反对假说的主要劝阻性论点。最后，我考虑了一个反对假设的论点，该论点与先验的唯心主义无关：如果我们假设相关概念（绝对绝对的总体概念），那么集合理论悖论的威胁。