Abstract Kant claims that the understanding prescribes the existence and necessity of empirical laws to nature, while it does not prescribe which particular empirical laws hold. That is to say, the understanding prescribes the general form of nature (lawfulness) and the form of the empirical laws (necessity) without prescribing the material content. But how is this possible? How can the understanding guarantee that there are necessary empirical laws without prescribing particular empirical laws to nature? In this paper, I want to answer this question by analyzing Kant’s argument for the Second Analogy of Experience in combination with an analysis of his conception of actuality. As I want to show, an application of Kant’s conception of actuality to the argument for the Second Analogy not only fills a gap in this argument, but also leads to an explanation of how the understanding can prescribe lawfulness to nature without prescribing particular laws.

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理解如何在不规定内容的情况下规定形式–康德在经验第二类比中的经验定律

摘要康德声称，这种理解规定了经验法则对自然的存在和必要性，而没有规定具体的经验法则所具有的性质。也就是说，理解规定了自然的一般形式（合法性）和经验法则的形式（必要性），而没有规定实质内容。但这怎么可能呢？这种理解如何能够保证存在必要的经验定律而又不对自然规定特定的经验定律？在本文中，我想通过分析康德的“第二类比”经验并结合对他的现实性概念的分析来回答这个问题。正如我想展示的，将康德的现实性概念应用于第二类推论的论点不仅填补了这一论证的空白，