Abstract Kant rejects Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). In quantum mechanics, Leibniz’s principle is also apparently violated. However, both ways of rejecting the PII differ significantly. In particular, Kant denies that spatiotemporal objects are unique individuals and establishes appearances as merely singular ones. The distinction between ‘unique’ and ‘singular’ individuals is crucial for the role that intuition plays in cognition: it will be shown that Kant’s way of rejecting the PII goes against the standard versions of conceptualism and non-conceptualism which, in turn, points out the relevance of this issue for the understanding of transcendental idealism. Finally, the systematic relevance will be checked by defending a Kantian interpretation of quantum individuality.

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康德对莱布尼兹原理的拒绝与量子物体的个性

摘要康德否定了莱布尼兹的“不可识别身份”（PII）。在量子力学中，显然也违反了莱布尼兹的原理。但是，两种拒绝PII的方式都有很大的不同。特别是，康德否认时空物体是独特的个体，并且将外表确定为仅仅是奇异的。“独特的”和“单一的”个体之间的区别对于直觉在认知中的作用至关重要：将表明，康德拒绝PII的方式违背了概念主义和非概念主义的标准形式，这反过来又指出了排除了这个问题对于理解先验唯心主义的意义。最后，通过捍卫康德对量子个体性的解释来检查系统的相关性。