Abstract When we judge something to be beautiful, do we identify an inherent feature of the object, or only our subjective response to it? This paper argues that, for Kant, pure aesthetic judgment occupies a middle ground. Such judgments are based upon affective responses to our own cognitive faculties. Thus, pure aesthetic judgment is subjective insofar as it concerns our feeling ourselves to be engaged in a certain task; it is objective insofar as the task we are engaged in is cognition of an object, and the faculties that we are feeling to be at work are the cognitive faculties of the understanding and the imagination. This paper locates this interpretation in the text of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment in the third Critique and uses it to make sense of many otherwise opaque features of Kant’s account of pure aesthetic judgment.

中文翻译：

---

审美作为认知的寄生

摘要当我们判断某个事物是美丽的时，我们是在识别物体的固有特征，还是仅仅对它的主观反应？本文认为，对于康德而言，纯粹的审美判断处于中间立场。这种判断是基于对我们自己的认知能力的情感反应。因此，纯粹的审美判断是主观的，只要它涉及我们自己从事某项工作的感觉。就我们所从事的任务是对一个物体的认知而言，这是客观的，而我们感觉正在工作的能力是理解和想象力的认知能力。本文将这种解释置于第三批批评的《审美评论》的文本中，并用它来理解康德关于纯审美判断的许多其他不透明的特征。