Abstract In this paper, I want to zero in on the Kantian idea that,whilst things in themselves must logically be presupposed as the ground underlying appearances and things are not reducible to their representations, (1) objects as appearances are not properties of things in themselves, and (2) things in themselves or the thing in itself cannot properly be represented or even thought. To do this, I turn to one of the earliest defenders and champions of the Kantian philosophy, Karl Leonhard Reinhold, and specifically to his first major work Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, published in 1789. I am here interested neither in the extent to which Reinhold’s interpretation of Kant is correct or even adequately represents Kant’s thought in all of its aspects, nor whether Reinhold’s attempt to present a systematic philosophy based on a rigorous deduction from a single principle (his strong foundationalism) stands up to scrutiny. I am here solely interested in some of Reinhold’s positive insights, in the Versuch, concerning elements of his representationalism that may shed light on Kant’s idealism, specifically, the relation between appearances (as objects of knowledge) and things in themselves, i. e., points (1) and (2) described above. I read the early Reinhold of the Versuch as confirming the Kantian view that objects as appearances are not properties of things in themselves and that we are radically ignorant of things in themselves, in the sense that we can neither know things in themselves (through the senses) nor even intellectually grasp things in themselves through the understanding alone.

中文翻译：

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在捍卫莱因霍尔德的康德代表制中：唯心主义理论中的唯心主义方面

摘要在本文中，我想将康德思想归零，即逻辑上必须以事物本身为前提，前提是事物本身在外观上是基础，并且事物不能还原为它们的表示形式，（1）物体不是事物在事物中的属性。 （2）本身的事物或事物本身无法正确表示甚至思考。为此，我转向康德哲学的最早捍卫者和拥护者卡尔·莱昂哈德·莱因霍尔德（Karl Leonhard Reinhold），尤其是1789年出版的他的第一部主要著作《 Versuch einer neuner neuen Theorie des menschlichenVorstellungsvermögens》。莱因霍尔德对康德的解释正确或什至足以代表康德所有方面的思想，莱因霍德（Reinhold）试图基于对单一原则的严格演绎（他的强大的基础主义）来提出系统哲学的尝试，也没有受到审查。我在这里只对赖因霍尔德在Versuch中的一些积极见解感兴趣，这些观点涉及他的代表主义的元素，这些元素可能有助于康德的唯心主义，特别是外表（作为知识的对象）与事物本身之间的关系，即点（上述1）和（2）。我读了早期的《 Verinhold》，证实了康德的观点，即作为外观的对象不是其本身的属性，而我们根本不了解其自身的内容，因为我们既无法了解自身的内容（通过感官） ），甚至不能仅凭自己的理解就从智力上掌握事物。