Abstract In this essay I analyse Kant’s view on the regulative role of reason, and in particular on what he describes as the ‘indispensably necessary’ role of ideas qua foci imaginarii in the Appendix. I review two influential readings of what has become known as the ‘transcendental illusion’ and I offer a novel reading that builds on some of the insights of these earlier readings. I argue that ideas of reason act as imaginary standpoints, which are indispensably necessary for scientific knowledge by making inter-conversational agreement possible. Thus, I characterise scientific knowledge as a distinctive kind of perspectival knowledge. This novel reading can illuminate the role of reason in complementing the faculty of understanding and sheds light on the apparent dichotomy between the first and the second part of the Appendix. More to the point, this novel reading takes us right to the heart of what scientific knowledge is, according to Kant, and how it differs from bogus knowledge and opinion.

中文翻译：

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所谓的“科学知识”是什么？–康德的假想立场和理性的调节作用

摘要在本文中，我分析了康德关于理性的调节作用的观点，尤其是他对附录中关于想象的思想所描述的“必不可少的”作用的看法。我回顾了两种有影响力的读物，这些读物被称为“先验幻觉”，并且我提供了一种新颖的读物，该读物基于这些早期读物的一些见解。我认为，理性观念是虚构的观点，通过使对话间的共识成为可能，这对于科学知识来说是必不可少的。因此，我将科学知识描述为一种独特的透视知识。这本新颖的读物可以阐明理性在补充理解能力方面的作用，并阐明附录第一部分和第二部分之间明显的二分法。更重要的是，