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Expansion of Self-consciousness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
Kant-Studien ( IF 0.9 ) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 , DOI: 10.1515/kant-2019-4002
Olga Lenczewska

Abstract This paper is a novel attempt at reconstructing Kant’s account of self-consciousness in the first Critique by making evident its gradual expository progression, and at identifying the epistemic status of the two modes of self-consciousness: pure and empirical. I trace the gradual exposition of theoretical self-consciousness across three crucial parts of the book: the Transcendental Deduction, the Refutation of Idealism, and the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. In doing so, I show that the account of theoretical self-consciousness is not presented to us all at once, but is progressively expanded and filled in. I also emphasize the importance of the distinction between the subject’s awareness of its existence, “Dasein”, and of its existence, “Existenz”. I conclude by discussing Kant’s preliminary remarks about practical self-consciousness in the Paralogisms, which bear an important relation to theoretical self-consciousness.

中文翻译:

康德纯理性批判中的自我意识的扩展

摘要本文是一种新颖的尝试,它通过证明康德的逐渐的阐释性发展来重建康德对自我意识的解释,并试图确定康德的两种自我意识模式的认识论地位:纯粹的和经验的。我在书中的三个关键部分追溯了理论自我意识的逐渐阐述:先验的演绎,唯心主义的驳斥和纯理性的旁白论。通过这样做,我表明,理论上的自我意识的说明并没有立即呈现给我们,而是逐渐扩展并填充了。我还强调了区分主体对自身存在的认识“ Dasein”的重要性。 ,及其存在的“存在”。
更新日期:2019-12-01
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