Krzysztof Brzechczyn’s important collection around Roth’s “revival” stimulates thought about the approaches adopted by analytical philosophers of history. Roth revives Danto’s 1965 pragmatic “constructivist” insights: in a narrative, earlier “events under a description” are described in terms of possibly unknowable later ones and, following Mink, in terms of possibly unknowable later concepts. Roth thinks of the resulting narrative explanation as justified in virtue of its constituting the object explained. However, earlier analytical philosophers of history faced different issues and adopted two different approaches: the positivist logical empiricist analysis used by Hempel (1942) and the nonpositivist “ordinary language” conceptual analysis of Oxford linguistic philosophers used by Dray (1957). Hempel’s Hume-sourced model of historical explanation set a scientific standard to be achieved, while Dray “tested” that analysis against historiographical practice. Both dubiously made “explanation” epistemologically central, as does Roth. Neither they nor later “narrativists” saw that more problematic was “compositionality”, the Hume-sourced view that the meanings of narratives were fully given by the meanings of their constituent sentences.

中文翻译：

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保罗·罗斯（Paul A.Roth）与历史分析哲学的复兴

Krzysztof Brzechczyn关于罗斯的“复兴”的重要著作激发了人们对历史分析哲学家所采用方法的思考。罗斯（Roth）复兴了丹托（Danto）1965年的务实的“建构主义”见解：在叙述中，较早的“描述之下的事件”是根据可能不为人知的较晚事件来描述的，而紧随Mink之后的则是根据可能不为人知的较晚概念来描述的。罗斯认为，由此产生的叙述性解释是合理的，因为它构成了解释的对象。但是，早期的历史分析哲学家面临着不同的问题，并采取了两种不同的方法：Hempel（1942）使用的实证主义逻辑经验主义分析和Dray（1957）使用的牛津语言哲学家的非实证主义“普通语言”概念分析。亨佩尔（Hempel）基于休H（Hume）的历史解释模型设定了要实现的科学标准，而德雷（Dray）则对历史分析进行了“检验”。两者都像罗斯一样，在认识论上都把“解释”置于中心地位。休ume派的观点认为，叙事者的含义完全由其构成句子的含义所赋予，因此他们和后来的“叙事主义者”都没有看到更多的问题是“构成性”。