abstract:This paper addresses Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion of solipsism in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It demonstrates that, throughout his early and middle periods, Wittgenstein's work on solipsism was focused on traditional solipsism, not semantic solipsism as is standardly supposed. It furthermore argues that the Tractatus's stated support for solipsism should be taken as a straightforward endorsement of the doctrine. In establishing this, it analyzes the connection between Wittgenstein's thought on solipsism and the metaphysical subject through the subjective-objective and subject-object distinctions, arguing that this holds the key to his comments on solipsism in the Tractatus.

中文翻译：

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维特根斯坦《论论》中的唯我论与自我

摘要：本文解决了路德维希·维特根斯坦 (Ludwig Wittgenstein) 在逻辑哲学论中对唯我论的讨论。它表明，在整个早期和中期，维特根斯坦关于唯我论的工作都集中在传统唯我论上，而不是标准假设的语义唯我论。它进一步认为，Tractatus 声明的对唯我论的支持应被视为对该学说的直接认可。在此基础上，通过主客体区分，分析了维特根斯坦的唯我论思想与形而上学主体的联系，认为这是维特根斯坦在《论论》中对唯我论的评论的关键。