A common theological perspective holds that God does not deceive because lying is morally wrong. While Plato denies the possibility of divine deception in the Republic, his explanation does not appeal to the wrongness of lying. Indeed, Plato famously recommends the careful use of lies as a means of promoting justice. Given his endorsement of occasional lying, as well as his claim that humans should strive to emulate the gods, Plato’s suggestion that the gods never have reason to lie is puzzling. Our solution to this puzzle centers on the fact that, unlike humans, the gods are self-sufficient. Although lying is good for the souls of neither humans nor gods, human interdependency necessitates lies that will prevent material harms and maintain a just order. In contrast, the self-sufficiency of the gods makes it impossible for them to benefit from deception. keywords Plato, Socrates, Republic, divine deception, noble lie, friendship Since God is omnipotent, he cannot die, he cannot be deceived, nor can he lie; and, as the Apostle says, ‘He cannot deny himself.’ . . . For if he could die, he would not be omnipotent; if he could lie, be deceived, deceive, or act in any unjust way, he would not be omnipotent, because if this were in him, he would not have been be worthy to be omnipotent. (Augustine, symb. cat. 1.2, CCL 46, 185–86)1 By ‘God’ I mean the very being the idea of whom is within me, that is, the possessor of all the perfections which I cannot grasp . . . who is subject to no defects whatsoever. It is clear enough from this that he cannot be a deceiver, since it is manifest by the natural light that fraud and deception depend on some defect. (Descartes, Meditations, AT VII.52/CSM II.35) the primary aim of this article is to elucidate a novel interpretive puzzle, which we call the ‘Platonic divine deception puzzle.’ The epigraphs above represent a 1 The citation scheme refers to section 1, paragraph 2 of the Corpus Christianorum version of Augustine’s symb. cat., which is located in volume 46 of that series on pages 185–86. 194 journal of the h istory of phi lo so phy 58 :2 apr i l 2020 common theological perspective on God’s ability to lie.2 Augustine, Descartes, and many other philosophers and theologians maintain that God cannot lie because deception is immoral and thereby incompatible with divine attributes such as moral perfection. In the Republic, Plato agrees that the gods do not deceive, but his explanation is different.3 Plato does not share the view that lying is always wrong; for instance, he maintains that it is appropriate to lie in order to prevent the ignorant or the insane from doing wrong (Republic 382c).4 Further, Plato’s Kallipolis is founded on a noble lie (γενναῖον ψεῦδος) in which the philosopher rulers deceive the inferior citizens in order to create and maintain a just society (Republic 414b–15d). Yet, according to Plato, the gods never lie because they have no reason to (Republic 382e). This is puzzling for at least two reasons. First, Plato claims that humans ought to strive to emulate the gods (Republic 383c, 500c–d, 501b, and 613a).5 If lying is something the gods would never do, then Plato’s endorsement of human lying is in tension with the assimilation directive. Second, if lying is a legitimate and effective means of facilitating justice within both an individual and a society, then we might expect that the gods, who love justice and the good, would have similar reasons to utilize deception.6 After developing the Platonic divine deception puzzle, we explore a number of solutions, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each position. Our preferred solution to the puzzle is found in Plato’s conception of friend and enemy in the Republic. For humans, friends are those individuals who are beneficial and good, while enemies are those who are useless and bad. Because we are not selfsufficient, we must live in societies and interact with individuals who stand toward us as both friend and enemy. These relations sometimes necessitate beneficial lies. Since the gods are self-sufficient, they have no need for such relations and the lies that they necessitate. Further, although the gods love all that is just and therefore love humans who are just, this does not imply that the gods benefit from humans becoming just. Hence, humans who become just are not friends of the gods in the relevant sense of ‘friend,’ and the fact that certain lies (such as the noble lie) can facilitate justice in humans is not a reason for the gods to tell them. The remainder of this article is divided into five sections. In section 1, we examine the relevant passages from Republic 2 in order to explicate the divine deception puzzle more fully. Sections 2 and 3 comprise discussions of initially tempting solutions that are ultimately problematic, including the possibility that Socrates’s claim that the gods do not deceive is itself a noble lie. In section 4, we 2 For an account of how Christian theologians and philosophers have addressed this issue throughout history, see Dallas Denery, The Devil Wins. 3 When discussing god, Plato frequently alternates between the singular and the plural. For a recent discussion, see Gerd Van Riel, Plato’s Gods, 34–37. 4 Translations of the Republic follow C. D. C. Reeve’s translation, with some minor changes. For Plato’s other work, we follow (roughly) those found in John Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson’s Plato: Complete Works. The Greek text for the Republic follows Slings’s Platonis Rempublicam; for Plato’s other works, it follows the latest edition of the Platonis Opera. 5 See also, Theaetetus 176a–b; Laws 716c–17b; Timaeus 90b–d; Phaedrus 246b–49c, 253a; Symposium 207d; and Phaedo 69a–c. For a discussion, see David Sedley, “The Ideal of Godlikeness”; and Jean-François Pradeau, “L’assimilation au Dieu”; and Julia Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New, 52–71. 6 For a discussion, see Franco Ferrari, “Theologia.” 195 tru e i n wo rd an d d eed present our favored solution, which appeals to the nature of certain social relations and the self-sufficiency of the gods. Finally, in section 5, we explain the sense in which humans who practice justice can become friends to the gods, despite the fact that humans cannot benefit the gods. A brief conclusion follows. 1 . t h e p l a t o n i c d i v i n e d e c e p t i o n p u z z l e The Greek word ψεῦδος is ambiguous between ‘lie’ and ‘mere falsehood.’7 The difference between a lie and a falsehood is the intention. All instances of ψεῦδος involve falsehood, but not all instances involve intentionally telling a falsehood. Accordingly, the context determines whether ‘lie’ or ‘falsehood’ is the appropriate translation of ψεῦδος. That Plato is tolerant not only of falsehoods but also of lies is clear from his discussion with Cephalus in Book 1 of the Republic. In Book 1, Cephalus tells Socrates that wealth is important for good and orderly people because it allows them to be just and thus allows them to secure a good afterlife. He explains: Not cheating or lying to someone against one’s will [τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι], not owing a sacrifice to some god or money to a person, and as a result departing for that other world in fear—the possession of wealth makes no small contribution to this. (Republic 331b1–4) Socrates responds by pointing out that justice is not simply a matter of speaking the truth or paying whatever debts one has incurred (Republic 331c). For instance, he says: Everyone would surely agree that if a man borrows weapons from a sane [σωφρονοῦντος] friend, and if he goes insane [μανεὶς] and asks for them back, the friend should not return them, and would not be just if he did. Nor should anyone be willing to tell the whole truth to someone in such a state. (Republic 331c5–8)8 Hence, sometimes it is inappropriate to pay back what one owes and to tell the whole truth.9 Socrates further explains what he has in mind in an obscure passage in Book 2, where he discusses with Adeimantus the musical education of young children. Currently, the Greeks teach their children stories of Hesiod, Homer, and other 7 Ψεῦδος can also mean fiction; we will address this issue further below. For a discussion on Archaic Greek views of fiction and falsehood, see Louise Pratt, Lying and Poetry. The main falsehoods in the Republic are found at 382a–d, 414b–15c, 416e–17b, 459c–60c, 468d–69b, and 614b–21b. 8 One might object that this does not demonstrate that Plato supports lying or telling falsehoods, but only supports the lesser claim that Plato permits not telling the whole truth, which, of course, is not the same as lying. However, if anything, this passage demonstrates that Plato is not concerned with the distinction between lying and not telling the truth. After all, Cephalus’s account of justice at 331b includes not lying; hence, for Socrates’s objection to work he must give an account in which lying or its equivalent is just, which means we must treat not telling the whole truth as equivalent to lying. See also, Republic 535d–e. 9 One might think that this passage conflicts with what Socrates says at 389b–c, in which he restricts lying in the Kallipolis to the rulers. However, this conflict is easily resolved. First, this passage occurs before the discussion of the Kallipolis and what is permitted in the Kallipolis might differ from what is permitted outside the Kallipolis. Second, Socrates’s point at 389b–c is not the extreme position that good consequences can never result from a non-philosopher lying. Rather, Socrates is making a statement about what will generally happen if non-philosophers lie. See Baima, “Death,” 277. 196 journal of the h istory of phi lo so phy 58 :2 apr i l 2020 poets. Socrates finds these stories objectionable and not suitable for his ideal city because they misrepresent the gods in two ways. First, in these stories the gods behave viciously (Republic 377d–78e). Socrates, for example, says that Hesiod tells

中文翻译：

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言行一致：柏拉图论神欺骗的不可能

一个普遍的神学观点认为，上帝不会欺骗，因为说谎在道德上是错误的。虽然柏拉图否认共和国存在神明欺骗的可能性，但他的解释并没有诉诸于说谎的错误。事实上，柏拉图著名地建议谨慎使用谎言作为促进正义的手段。鉴于他赞同偶尔撒谎，以及他声称人类应该努力模仿众神，柏拉图关于众神永远没有理由撒谎的建议令人费解。我们解决这个难题的核心是这样一个事实，即与人类不同，众神是自给自足的。虽然说谎对人或神的灵魂都没有好处，但人与人之间的相互依存需要谎言来防止物质伤害并维持公正的秩序。相比之下，众神的自给自足，使他们不可能从欺骗中获益。关键词柏拉图，苏格拉底，共和国，神的欺骗，高贵的谎言，友谊 既然上帝是全能的，他不会死，他不会被欺骗，也不会撒谎；而且，正如使徒所说，“他不能否认自己。” . . . 因为如果他能死，他就不是万能的；如果他能说谎、被欺骗、欺骗或以任何不公正的方式行事，他就不是万能的，因为如果在他里面，他就不配成为万能的。(Augustine, symb. cat. 1.2, CCL 46, 185–86)1 我所说的“上帝”是指我内在的“谁”的概念，即我无法掌握的所有完美的拥有者。. . 谁没有任何缺陷。由此可见，他不可能是骗子，因为从自然光中可以看出欺诈和欺骗取决于某些缺陷。(Descartes, Meditations, AT VII.52/CSM II.35) 这篇文章的主要目的是阐明一个新的解释谜题，我们称之为“柏拉图神的欺骗谜题”。上面的题词代表 1 引用方案是指奥古斯丁符号的 Corpus Christianorum 版本的第 1 节第 2 段。目录，位于该系列第 46 卷第 185-86 页。194 phi lo so phy 历史杂志 58 :2 2020 年 4 月 2 日 关于上帝说谎能力的共同神学观点。2 奥古斯丁、笛卡尔和许多其他哲学家和神学家坚持认为上帝不能说谎，因为欺骗是不道德的，因此与欺骗不相容。神圣的属性，如道德完美。在共和国，柏拉图同意众神不会欺骗，但他的解释是不同的。3柏拉图不同意说谎总是错误的观点；例如，他坚持说，为了防止无知或疯子做错事，撒谎是恰当的（共和国 382c）。4 此外，柏拉图的 Kallipolis 是建立在一个高贵的谎言（γενναῖον ψεῦδος）之上的，在这种谎言中，哲学家的统治者欺骗了低等公民，以创建和维持一个公正的社会（共和国 414b-15d）。然而，根据柏拉图的说法，众神从不说谎，因为他们没有理由（共和国 382e）。这至少有两个原因令人费解。首先，柏拉图声称人类应该努力效仿诸神（共和国 383c、500c-d、501b 和 613a）。5 如果说谎是诸神永远不会做的事情，那么柏拉图对人类说谎的认可与同化是矛盾的。指示。第二，如果说谎是在个人和社会中促进正义的合法而有效的手段，那么我们可能会期望热爱正义和善良的诸神有类似的理由来利用欺骗。6 在开发柏拉图式的神圣欺骗谜题之后，我们探索了多种解决方案，权衡了每个职位的优缺点。我们对这个谜题的首选解决方案是柏拉图关于共和国的朋友和敌人的概念。对于人类来说，朋友是有益的和好的人，敌人是无用的和坏的。因为我们不能自给自足，所以我们必须生活在社会中，并与把我们视为朋友和敌人的个人互动。这些关系有时需要有益的谎言。既然诸神自给自足，他们不需要这种关系和他们需要的谎言。再者，虽然神爱一切公义，因此也爱公义的人，但这并不意味着神因人变得公正而受益。因此，变得正义的人类不是“朋友”相关意义上的神的朋友，某些谎言（如高尚的谎言）可以促进人类正义的事实并不是神告诉他们的理由。本文的其余部分分为五个部分。在第 1 节中，我们检查了共和国 2 中的相关段落，以便更全面地解释神的欺骗之谜。第 2 节和第 3 节讨论了最初诱人的解决方案，但最终却是有问题的，包括苏格拉底声称众神不会欺骗本身就是一个高尚的谎言的可能性。在第 4 节中，我们 2 有关基督教神学家和哲学家在整个历史中如何解决这个问题的说明，请参阅达拉斯·丹尼 (Dallas Denery)，《魔鬼获胜》(The Devil Wins)。3 在讨论上帝时，柏拉图经常在单数和复数之间交替使用。有关最近的讨论，请参阅 Gerd Van Riel，Plato's Gods，34-37。4 共和国的翻译遵循CDC Reeve 的翻译，但有一些细微的变化。对于柏拉图的其他作品，我们（大致）遵循约翰·库珀和 DS Hutchinson 的柏拉图：全集中的作品。共和国的希腊文本遵循 Slings 的 Platonis Rempublicam；对于柏拉图的其他作品，它遵循最新版的柏拉图歌剧。5 另见，泰阿泰德 176a-b；法律 716c-17b；Timaeu​​s 90b-d；斐德罗 246b–49c，253a；研讨会207d；和斐多 69a-c。有关讨论，请参阅大卫·塞德利 (David Sedley)，“与上帝相似的理想”；和让-弗朗索瓦·普拉多，“L'assimilation au Dieu”；和 Julia Annas，柏拉图伦理学，新旧，52-71。6 有关讨论，请参阅 Franco Ferrari，“Theologia”。195 tru ein word 和 dd eed 提出了我们偏爱的解决方案，它诉诸于某些社会关系的性质和众神的自给自足。最后，在第 5 节中，我们解释了实践正义的人类可以成为神的朋友的意义，尽管事实上人类无法利益神。下面是一个简短的结论。1 . theplatonicdivinedece ptionpuzzle 希腊词ψεῦδος 在“谎言”和“纯粹的谎言”之间存在歧义。7 谎言和谎言之间的区别在于意图。ψεῦδος 的所有实例都涉及虚假，但并非所有实例都涉及故意说谎。因此，上下文决定了“谎言”还是“谎言”是 ψεῦδος 的恰当翻译。柏拉图不仅容忍谎言，而且容忍谎言，这从他在《共和国》第一卷中与 Cephalus 的讨论中可以清楚地看出。在第一本书中，Cephalus 告诉苏格拉底，财富对善良而有秩序的人很重要，因为它可以让他们保持公正，从而确保他们有一个美好的来世。他解释说：不欺骗或违背自己的意愿向某人说谎 [τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι]，不欠某个神的祭祀或金钱给一个人，以及因为其他世界的离开而恐惧财富对此做出了不小的贡献。(Republic 331b1-4) 苏格拉底回应指出，正义不仅仅是说实话或支付任何债务的问题(Republic 331c)。例如，他说：每个人都会同意，如果一个人从一个理智的 [σωφρονοῦντος] 朋友那里借来武器，如果他发疯了 [μανεὶς] 并要求他们归还，那么这个朋友不应该归还，而且不会公正如果他这样做了。也不应该有人愿意向处于这种状态的人说出全部真相。(Republic 331c5–8)8 因此，有时偿还欠债并说出全部真相是不合适的。 9 苏格拉底在第 2 卷的一段晦涩的段落中进一步解释了他的想法，在那里他与 Adeimantus 讨论了音乐剧幼儿教育。目前，希腊人教他们的孩子有关赫西奥德、荷马和其他 7 个 Ψεῦδος 的故事也可以指小说；我们将在下面进一步讨论这个问题。有关古希腊对虚构和谎言的看法的讨论，请参阅路易丝·普拉特 (Louise Pratt) 的谎言和诗歌。共和国的主要谎言在 382a–d、414b–15c、416e–17b、459c–60c、468d–69b 和 614b–21b。8 有人可能会反对说，这并不能证明柏拉图支持说谎或说谎，而只是支持了柏拉图允许不说全部真相的次要主张，当然，这与说谎不同。然而，如果有的话，这段话表明柏拉图并不关心说谎和不说实话之间的区别。毕竟，Cephalus 在 331b 中对正义的描述包括不说谎；因此，对于苏格拉底对工作的反对，他必须说明说谎或其等价物是正义的，这意味着我们必须将不说出全部真相等同于说谎。另见共和国 535d-e。9 有人可能认为这段话与苏格拉底在 389b-c 所说的相冲突，在其中他限制统治者在卡利波利斯撒谎。然而，这个冲突很容易解决。首先，这段话发生在讨论 Kallipolis 之前，Kallipolis 中允许的内容可能与 Kallipolis 之外允许的内容不同。其次，苏格拉底在 389b-c 的观点并不是一个极端的立场，即非哲学家的谎言永远不会产生好的结果。相反，苏格拉底正在声明如果非哲学家撒谎通常会发生什么。见白马，“死亡”，277. 196 phi lo so phy history of phi lo so phy 58 :2 apr il 2020 诗人。苏格拉底认为这些故事令人反感，不适合他理想的城市，因为它们以两种方式歪曲了众神。首先，在这些故事中，众神的行为是恶毒的（共和国 377d-78e）。例如，苏格拉底说赫西奥德告诉 然而，这个冲突很容易解决。首先，这段话发生在讨论 Kallipolis 之前，Kallipolis 中允许的内容可能与 Kallipolis 之外允许的内容不同。其次，苏格拉底在 389b-c 的观点并不是一个极端的立场，即非哲学家的谎言永远不会产生好的结果。相反，苏格拉底正在声明如果非哲学家撒谎通常会发生什么。见白马，“死亡”，277. 196 phi lo so phy history of phi lo so phy 58 :2 apr il 2020 诗人。苏格拉底认为这些故事令人反感，不适合他理想的城市，因为它们以两种方式歪曲了众神。首先，在这些故事中，众神的行为是恶毒的（共和国 377d-78e）。例如，苏格拉底说赫西奥德告诉 然而，这个冲突很容易解决。首先，这段话发生在讨论 Kallipolis 之前，Kallipolis 中允许的内容可能与 Kallipolis 之外允许的内容不同。其次，苏格拉底在 389b-c 的观点并不是一个极端的立场，即非哲学家的谎言永远不会产生好的结果。相反，苏格拉底正在声明如果非哲学家撒谎通常会发生什么。见白马，“死亡”，277. 196 phi lo so phy history of phi lo so phy 58 :2 apr il 2020 诗人。苏格拉底认为这些故事令人反感，不适合他理想的城市，因为它们以两种方式歪曲了众神。首先，在这些故事中，众神的行为是恶毒的（共和国 377d-78e）。例如，苏格拉底说赫西奥德告诉 这段话发生在讨论 Kallipolis 之前，Kallipolis 中允许的内容可能与 Kallipolis 之外允许的内容不同。其次，苏格拉底在 389b-c 的观点并不是一个极端的立场，即非哲学家的谎言永远不会产生好的结果。相反，苏格拉底正在声明如果非哲学家撒谎通常会发生什么。见白马，“死亡”，277. 196 phi lo so phy history of phi lo so phy 58 :2 apr il 2020 诗人。苏格拉底认为这些故事令人反感，不适合他理想的城市，因为它们以两种方式歪曲了众神。首先，在这些故事中，众神的行为是恶毒的（共和国 377d-78e）。例如，苏格拉底说赫西奥德告诉 这段话发生在讨论 Kallipolis 之前，Kallipolis 中允许的内容可能与 Kallipolis 之外允许的内容不同。其次，苏格拉底在 389b-c 的观点并不是一个极端的立场，即非哲学家的谎言永远不会产生好的结果。相反，苏格拉底正在声明如果非哲学家撒谎通常会发生什么。见白马，“死亡”，277. 196 phi lo so phy history of phi lo so phy 58 :2 apr il 2020 诗人。苏格拉底认为这些故事令人反感，不适合他理想的城市，因为它们以两种方式歪曲了众神。首先，在这些故事中，众神的行为是恶毒的（共和国 377d-78e）。例如，苏格拉底说赫西奥德告诉 其次，苏格拉底在 389b-c 的观点并不是一个极端的立场，即非哲学家的谎言永远不会产生好的结果。相反，苏格拉底正在声明如果非哲学家撒谎通常会发生什么。见白马，“死亡”，277. 196 phi lo so phy history of phi lo so phy 58 :2 apr il 2020 诗人。苏格拉底认为这些故事令人反感，不适合他理想的城市，因为它们以两种方式歪曲了众神。首先，在这些故事中，众神的行为是恶毒的（共和国 377d-78e）。例如，苏格拉底说赫西奥德告诉 其次，苏格拉底在 389b-c 的观点并不是一个极端的立场，即非哲学家的谎言永远不会产生好的结果。相反，苏格拉底正在声明如果非哲学家撒谎通常会发生什么。见白马，“死亡”，277. 196 phi lo so phy history of phi lo so phy 58 :2 apr il 2020 诗人。苏格拉底认为这些故事令人反感，不适合他理想的城市，因为它们以两种方式歪曲了众神。首先，在这些故事中，众神的行为是恶毒的（共和国 377d-78e）。例如，苏格拉底说赫西奥德告诉 196 phi lo so phy 历史杂志 58 :2 apr il 2020 诗人。苏格拉底认为这些故事令人反感，不适合他理想的城市，因为它们以两种方式歪曲了众神。首先，在这些故事中，众神的行为是恶毒的（共和国 377d-78e）。例如，苏格拉底说赫西奥德告诉 196 phi lo so phy 历史杂志 58 :2 apr il 2020 诗人。苏格拉底认为这些故事令人反感，不适合他理想的城市，因为它们以两种方式歪曲了众神。首先，在这些故事中，众神的行为是恶毒的（共和国 377d-78e）。例如，苏格拉底说赫西奥德告诉