Another set of essays tackles a cluster of difficult questions concerning inner sense, selfconsciousness, and the cognitive subject. Ralf Bader gives an account of how both inner and outer objects end up in time, even though time is only the form of inner sense. Though Kant is typically read as denying that we have any awareness of a substantial self, Andrew Chignell argues that there are no good textual or philosophical reasons to deny substantiality of the empirical self cognized through inner sense, while Ralph Walker argues that there is in fact a synthetic a priori argument for the claim that the transcendental self is a substance. Tobias Rosefeldt and Paul Snowdon discuss Kant’s arguments in the paralogisms. In a compelling essay, Rosefeldt rejects a standard reading of the first paralogism, and argues instead that Kant criticizes the rational psychologist for mistaking the formal non-predicability of the “I” for cognition of a metaphysical substance. Finally, Snowdon argues that Kant’s rejection of rational psychology in the paralogisms rests unacceptably on his transcendental idealism. A final set of essays has to do with Kant’s account of judgment. Patricia Kitcher argues that Kant is a “natural enemy” (172) of views that hold that beliefs are “transparent” to the world. On Kitcher’s view, Kant’s claim that judgment requires consciousness of one’s own rational activity means that he would deny that one can come to know what one believes simply by “looking outwards” to the world (170). Drawing on similar considerations, Jessica Leech attempts to explain Kant’s puzzling claim, that every judgment must have a modality, by appealing to the fact that, for Kant, every judgment must be inferentially connected to others in a course of self-conscious reasoning. Finally, Jill Vance Buroker examines the extent to which practical judgment can play a role in determining the various modes of theoretical assent allowed by Kant. Space constraints prevent me from engaging critically with the individual essays. A couple of omissions are noteworthy: the relationship between mind and body, for example, is only briefly discussed (13–14, 213–14). This is somewhat disappointing, especially given Gomes’s eye-catching declaration that Kant “took his transcendental idealism to dispose of the problem of mind and matter relations” (14). Another neglected issue concerns the nature and scope of empirical psychology. Recent scholarship has attempted to situate a positive conception of psychology within Kant’s account (e.g. Patrick Frierson, Kant’s Empirical Psychology, 2014); and Kant’s remark in §4 of the Anthropology that it is through psychology that we investigate the self that is given to inner sense suggests that there is a direct relation between this endeavor and the concerns of many of the included essays. Nevertheless, the topics covered are certainly central to Kant’s account, and they get a vigorous and ambitious treatment here. The volume should be of interest not only to Kant scholars but to anyone curious about current debates concerning Kant’s account of the mind. J a n u m S e t h i

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费希特的《自然权利基础：批判指南》。加布里埃尔·戈特利布

另一组文章解决了一系列关于内在感觉、自我意识和认知主题的难题。拉尔夫·巴德 (Ralf Bader) 解释了内部和外部对象如何在时间中结束，即使时间只是内部感觉的形式。尽管康德通常被解读为否认我们对实体自我有任何认识，但安德鲁·奇格内尔认为，没有充分的文本或哲学理由来否认通过内在感觉认知的经验自我的实体性，而拉尔夫·沃克则认为事实上存在先验自我是实体这一主张的综合先验论证。Tobias Rosefeldt 和 Paul Snowdon 在旁系学中讨论了康德的论点。在一篇引人入胜的文章中，罗斯菲尔德拒绝了对第一个旁系主义的标准解读，相反，康德批评理性心理学家将“我”的形式不可预测性误认为是对形而上学实体的认知。最后，斯诺登认为，康德在旁系推理中拒绝理性心理学是基于他的先验唯心主义，这是不可接受的。最后一组散文与康德的判断论有关。帕特里夏·基彻 (Patricia Kitcher) 认为，康德是认为信仰对世界“透明”的观点的“天敌”(172)。在基彻看来，康德声称判断需要对自己的理性活动有意识，这意味着他否认人们可以通过“向外看”世界来了解自己的信仰（170）。基于类似的考虑，杰西卡·里奇试图解释康德令人费解的主张，即每个判断都必须有一个模态，通过诉诸这样的事实，对康德来说，在自我意识推理过程中，每一个判断都必须在推论上与其他判断相联系。最后，吉尔·万斯·布罗克 (Jill Vance Buroker) 考察了实践判断在决定康德所允许的各种理论同意模式方面可以发挥作用的程度。空间限制使我无法批判性地参与个别文章。一些遗漏值得注意：例如，仅简要讨论了身心之间的关系 (13-14, 213-14)。这有点令人失望，特别是考虑到戈麦斯引人注目的声明，即康德“用他的先验唯心主义来解决心灵和物质关系的问题”（14）。另一个被忽视的问题涉及经验心理学的性质和范围。最近的学术研究试图将积极的心理学概念置于康德的叙述中（例如 Patrick Frierson，Kant's Empirical Psychology，2014）；康德在《人类学》第 4 节中的评论是，我们通过心理学来研究赋予内在感觉的自我，这表明这种努力与所包含的许多论文的关注点之间存在直接关系。尽管如此，所涵盖的主题无疑是康德叙述的核心，并且它们在这里得到了有力而雄心勃勃的处理。这本书不仅对康德学者感兴趣，而且对任何对当前有关康德心智解释的辩论感到好奇的人都应该感兴趣。民族志 康德在《人类学》第 4 节中的评论是，我们通过心理学来研究赋予内在感觉的自我，这表明这种努力与所包含的许多论文的关注点之间存在直接关系。尽管如此，所涵盖的主题无疑是康德叙述的核心，并且它们在这里得到了有力而雄心勃勃的处理。这本书不仅对康德学者感兴趣，而且对任何对当前有关康德心智解释的辩论感到好奇的人都应该感兴趣。民族志 康德在《人类学》第 4 节中的评论是，我们通过心理学来研究赋予内在感觉的自我，这表明这种努力与所包含的许多论文的关注点之间存在直接关系。尽管如此，所涵盖的主题无疑是康德叙述的核心，并且它们在这里得到了有力而雄心勃勃的处理。这本书不仅对康德学者感兴趣，而且对任何对当前有关康德心智解释的辩论感到好奇的人都应该感兴趣。民族志 这本书不仅对康德学者感兴趣，而且对任何对当前有关康德心智解释的辩论感到好奇的人都应该感兴趣。民族志 这本书不仅对康德学者感兴趣，而且对任何对当前有关康德心智解释的辩论感到好奇的人都应该感兴趣。民族志