Just as the existence of practical akrasia has been treated as important evidence for the existence of our practical agency, the alleged absence of epistemic akrasia—cases in which a believer believes some proposition contrary to her considered judgments about what she has most reason to believe—has recently been marshaled as grounds for skepticism about the existence of similar forms of epistemic agency. In this paper, I defend the existence of epistemic agency against such objections. Rather than argue against the impossibility of epistemic akrasia, I argue that the impossibility of epistemic akrasia is actually compatible with the existence of epistemic agency. The crucial mistake, I argue, is that skeptics about epistemic agency are failing to distinguish carefully between differences in the structure of believing and acting and differences in the structure of normative reasons to believe and normative reasons to act. I show that once these ‘environmental’ differences are properly distinguished, we can see that absence of epistemic akrasia provides no reason to doubt that practical and epistemic agency are on a par with one another.

中文翻译：

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机构、Akrasia 和规范环境

正如实际 akrasia 的存在被视为我们实际机构存在的重要证据一样，所谓的认知 akrasia 缺失——在这种情况下，信徒相信某些命题，与她对她最有理由相信的东西的深思熟虑的判断相反——最近被编组为怀疑存在类似形式的认知机构的理由。在本文中，我为此类反对意见辩护了认知代理的存在。我没有反对认知 akrasia 的不可能性，而是认为认知 akrasia 的不可能性实际上是兼容认知代理的存在。我认为，关键的错误在于，对认知能动性持怀疑态度的人未能仔细区分相信和行动结构的差异，以及相信和行动的规范性理由结构的差异。我表明，一旦正确区分了这些“环境”差异，我们就可以看到，缺乏认知 akrasia 就没有理由怀疑实际和认知机构彼此相提并论。