Many philosophers take purportedly logical cases of ground (such as a true disjunction being grounded in its true disjunct(s)) to be obvious cases, and indeed such cases have been used to motivate the existence of and importance of ground. I argue against this. I do so by motivating two kinds of semantic determination relations. Intuitions of logical ground track these semantic relations. Moreover, our knowledge of semantics for (e.g.) first order logic can explain why we have such intuitions. And, I argue, neither semantic relation can be a species of ground even on a quite broad conception of what ground is. Hence, without a positive argument for taking so-called ‘logical ground’ to be something distinct from a semantic determination relation, we should cease treating logical cases as cases of ground.

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揭穿逻辑基础：区分形而上学和语义学

许多哲学家将所谓的根据的逻辑案例（例如真实的析取基于其真实的析取）视为明显的案例，实际上这些案例已被用来激发根据的存在和重要性。我反对这一点。我通过激发两种语义确定关系来做到这一点。逻辑基础的直觉跟踪这些语义关系。此外，我们对（例如）一阶逻辑的语义知识可以解释为什么我们有这样的直觉。而且，我认为，即使在一个相当广泛的根据是什么的概念上，这两种语义关系都不能是一种根据。因此，如果没有一个积极的论据来将所谓的“逻辑根据”与语义确定关系不同，我们应该停止将逻辑案例视为根据的案例。