Philosophical views of responsibility often identify responsible agency with capacities such as rationality and self-control. Yet in ordinary life, we frequently hold individuals responsible who are deficient in these capacities, such as children or people with mental illness. The existing literature that addresses these cases has suggested that we merely pretend to hold these agents responsible or that they are responsible to a diminished degree. In this paper, I demonstrate that neither of these approaches is satisfactory, and I offer an alternative focused on the role relationships play in determining whether it is appropriate to hold someone responsible. I argue that relationships are sources of normative expectations about how parties in that relationship ought to behave and that we can be responsible in virtue of being subject to these norms. This is so not only for those who are impaired or immature, but for all of us.

中文翻译：

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所谓边际代理人的责任与问题

责任的哲学观点经常将责任机构认定为具有理性和自我控制等能力。然而在日常生活中，我们经常让那些缺乏这些能力的人承担责任，例如儿童或患有精神疾病的人。解决这些案例的现有文献表明，我们只是假装让这些代理人负责，或者他们的责任程度有所降低。在本文中，我证明了这两种方法都不能令人满意，并且我提供了一种替代方法，重点关注关系在确定是否适合让某人负责时所起的作用。我认为，关系是关系中各方应该如何行事的规范期望的来源，并且我们可以通过遵守这些规范来负责。