The Free Choice effect—whereby ♢ ( p or q ) $\lozenge (p {\textsc {or}} q)$ seems to entail both ♢ p $\lozenge p$ and ♢ q $\lozenge q$ —has traditionally been characterized as a phenomenon affecting the deontic modal ‘may’. This paper presents an extension of the semantic account of free choice defended by Fusco ( Philosophers’ Imprint , 15 , 1–27, 2015 ) to the agentive modal ‘can’, the ‘can’ which, intuitively, describes an agent’s powers. On this account, free choice is a nonspecific de re phenomenon (Bäuerle 1983 ; Fodor 1970 ) that—unlike typical cases—affects disjunction. I begin by sketching a model of inexact ability, which grounds a modal approach to agency (Belnap Theoria , 54 , 175–199, 1998 ; Perloff 2001 ) in a Williamson ( Mind, 101 , 217–242, 1992 ; Erkenntnis , 79 , 971–999, 2014 )-style margin of error. A classical propositional semantics combined with this framework can reflect the intuitions highlighted by Kenny ( 1976 )’s dartboard cases, as well as the counterexamples to simple conditional views recently discussed by Mandelkern et al. ( Philosophical Review , 126 , 301–343, 2017 ). In Section 3, I turn to an independently motivated actual-world-sensitive account of disjunction, and show how it extends free choice inferences into an object language for propositional modal logic.

中文翻译：

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代理自由选择

自由选择效应——其中 ♢ ( p 或 q ) $\lozenge (p {\textsc {or}} q)$ 似乎同时包含 ♢ p $\lozenge p$ 和 ♢ q $\lozenge q$ ——表征为影响道义模态“可能”的现象。本文将 Fusco (Philosophers' Imprint, 15, 1–27, 2015) 所捍卫的自由选择的语义解释扩展到代理模态“can”，“can”直观地描述了代理的权力。因此，自由选择是一种非特定的 de re 现象 (Bäuerle 1983 ; Fodor 1970 )，与典型案例不同，它会影响分离。我首先勾勒出一个不精确能力的模型，该模型在威廉姆森 (Mind, 101, 217-242, 1992; Erkenntnis, 971–999, 2014 ) 风格的误差幅度。结合这个框架的经典命题语义可以反映 Kenny (1976) 的飞镖案例所强调的直觉，以及 Mandelkern 等人最近讨论的简单条件视图的反例。（哲学评论，126，301-343，2017）。在第 3 节中，我转向独立驱动的对现实世界敏感的析取解释，并展示它如何将自由选择推理扩展到命题模态逻辑的对象语言中。