Abstract Debate in philosophy of language and linguistics has focused on conceptual representations/propositional thought; as a result there has been little discussion on the effability of perceptual or, more generally, phenomenal representations and the communicative difficulties associated with them. In this paper, I start from an example based on the relative ineffability of kinaesthetic representations, i. e. representations involving bodily posture and movement, and then generalise the discussion by looking at the reasons why – even when there are no limits on either the richness of available contexts or the ways in which contextual material could be used to enrich linguistically encoded meanings – perceptual/phenomenal representations test our expressive capacities to the limit. Some recent work on linguistics suggests that the ineffability problem arises mainly with words whose linguistic meanings are tightly associated with perception. Arguing that a much wider variety of linguistic expressions can evoke phenomenal states – including proper names, whose main function is referential – I will try to show that the challenges phenomenal experience poses for our communicative abilities reach well beyond the limited range of those expressions tightly associated with emotion and perception.

中文翻译：

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知觉的诅咒：来自运动感觉的案例

摘要语言和语言学哲学的争论集中在概念表示/命题思想上。结果，关于知觉表示或更普遍的现象表示的有效性以及与之相关的沟通困难的讨论很少。在本文中，我将从基于动觉表示的相对无效率的示例开始，即。e。包括身体姿势和动作的表征，然后通过探讨其原因（包括可用上下文的丰富性或使用上下文材料来丰富语言编码的含义的方式没有任何限制）的原因来概括讨论—感知/惊人的表现将我们的表达能力测试到极限。关于语言学的一些最新研究表明，无法避免问题主要是由于其语言含义与感知紧密相关的单词引起的。我认为，各种各样的语言表达方式都可以唤起现象状态，包括专有名称（其主要功能是指称），我将尝试证明现象体验给我们的沟通能力带来的挑战远远超出了紧密关联的那些表达范围与情感和知觉。