“Moore–Wittgenstein controversy” on the problem of certainty should be understood and studied from two perspectives—one from philosophical use of ordinary language (Moore) and the other from using ordinary language for normal linguistic exchange (Wittgenstein). To study it from one and only one perspective—either Moorean or Wittgensteinean—is narrow and biased. Looked at from the normal linguistic exchange, Wittgenstein’s arguments are convincing and Moore’s truisms seem rather odd. But when looked at from philosophical discourse and his defence of common sense, Moore’s truisms are interesting and not faulty.

中文翻译：

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G. Vedaparayana教授对我的论文“维特根斯坦对摩尔的确定性命题的批评……”的评论的回应

应该从两个角度理解和研究关于确定性问题的“摩尔-维特根斯坦争论”，一个是从哲学上使用普通语言（摩尔），另一个是从使用普通语言进行正常语言交换（维特根斯坦）。从一个或唯一一个角度（摩尔人或维特根斯坦人）进行研究是狭narrow而有偏见的。从正常的语言交流来看，维特根斯坦的论点令人信服，摩尔的真实性似乎很奇怪。但是，从哲学的话语和他对常识的辩护来看，摩尔的真实性是有趣的，而不是错误的。