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Notion of Intentionality in Vijňānavāda
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research ( IF 0.1 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-02 , DOI: 10.1007/s40961-020-00218-2
Surya Kant Maharana

The paper aims at bringing out a valid comparison between the notion of intentionality portrayed in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and that of Vijňānavāda in general. One of the crucial objectives of the Husserlian phenomenology is to understand the nature of consciousness. To Husserl, Consciousness is always intentional, that is, intended or directed towards something. It constitutes the world in the sense of bestowing meaning and being to the world. The object intended by consciousness may or may not be there, but it certainly has a sense. Husserl makes a distinction between empirical and transcendental consciousness. To him, the empirical ego is momentary whilst the transcendental ego survives all reduction and presides over all epistemic acts. To explore whether the Vijňānavadins propose a similar notion of Consciousness and its intentionality would be the primary objective of the paper. On the other hand, to Vijňānavāda, the apparent external world is projected by the Absolute Consciousness, the Ālaya, not by the individual consciousness or Vijňāna. Vijňānavāda distinguishes between individual consciousness (pravritti Vijňāna) and absolute consciousness (Ālaya Vijňāna). All intentional acts are performed by the individual consciousness having the Ālaya Vijňāna as its background. The Ālaya manifests itself as subject and object as well as seven pravritti Vijňānas. They are intended and constituted by the Ālaya. It, therefore, follows that Ālaya is always intentionally correlated with the pravritti Vijňānas. Vijňānavāda appears to be a kind of constitutive phenomenology rather than idealism.

中文翻译:

意向中的意向性概念

本文旨在对埃德蒙·胡塞尔现象学所描绘的意向性概念与一般的维贾纳瓦达现象进行有效的比较。胡塞尔现象学的关键目标之一就是了解意识的本质。对于胡塞尔来说,意识永远是有意的,也就是说,是有意或有针对性的。它在赋予意义和存在于世界的意义上构成了世界。意识意图的对象可能存在或可能不存在,但是它确实具有某种意义。胡塞尔对经验意识和先验意识进行了区分。对他来说,经验性自我是一时的,而先验性自我则在所有还原中幸存下来,并负责所有认知行为。探索维贾那瓦丁人是否提出类似的意识概念及其意图性将是本文的主要目标。另一方面,对维哈那瓦达而言,表面上的外部世界是由绝对意识,“Ā”所投射的,而不是由个人意识或维哈那那所投射的。Vijňānavāda区分个人意识(pravrittiVijňāna)和绝对意识(ĀlayaVijňāna)。所有有意行为都是以“ĀlayaVijňāna”为背景的个人意识执行的。Ālaya表现为主体和客体,以及七个pravrittiVijňānas。它们由Ālaya构成。因此,可以得出结论,alaya总是有意与pravrittiVijňānas相关。
更新日期:2020-09-02
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