origins of Soviet biological weapons research—developments that took place during and after World War II, including scientific and industrial achievements as well as a brief discussion connecting this history to post-Soviet Russian BW activities. Rimmington’s narrative merits a close reading, not least because of the large number of individuals involved, the various and changing names of Soviet research efforts and facilities, and the sheer complexity of the history being explored. Various organizational and bacteriological acronyms also contribute to this density—a table of abbreviations would have been a helpful addition to the book. Rimmington fails to accomplish only one of his stated objectives—demonstrating the potential of Stalin’s BW program to “shed much light” on how modern states might secretly be engaging in similar activities (p. 2)—apart from discussing government totalitarian controls (p. 57) and safety failures (pp. 67–68). This omission aside, Rimmington succeeds in bringing detailed focus to the early period of Soviet BW research, highlighting Stalin’s role, and explaining the German-Soviet standoff over the deployment of biological weapons during World War II (pp. 39–56, 56–63, 137–174). Finally, Rimmington brings the narrative forward to consider later developments, Stalin’s legacy, and even current Russian military biological research. This coverage, though brief, highlights post–World War II developments (pp. 176–186); scientific and industrial achievements, including a live culture anthrax vaccine reported to be more effective than non-live U.S. or British vaccines (pp. 187–202); and Stalin’s legacy in the current Russian BW effort (pp. 203–206). Rimmington observes that, in addition to the Soviet offensive weapons program, Stalin’s legacy can still be observed. Almost the entire core military BW infrastructure created during the time of his leadership remains in place today. Moreover, the three BW facilities Stalin established at Kirov, Ekaterinburg, and Sergiev Posad remain in “full operation,” along with a Stalinera veterinary anthrax vaccine facility (pp. 204–206). Detailed coverage of later Soviet BW activities is beyond the scope of Rimmington’s book and is, as he points out, well documented (pp. 1, 205). Rimmington succeeds in shifting the focus to an earlier period in Soviet history, examining the fragmented and reactive roots of Soviet BW research, and highlighting the integral roles played by similar German efforts and by Stalin himself. Thorough and well researched, this book presents a detailed overview of early Soviet BW activities, as well as the chaotic and harsh environment in which these activities developed.

中文翻译：

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冷战中的巴尔干半岛。作者：Svetozar Rajak 等人，编辑，伦敦：Palgrave Macmillan，2017 年。372 页。106.99 欧元。

苏联生物武器研究的起源——二战期间和之后发生的发展，包括科学和工业成就，以及将这段历史与苏联后苏联生物武器活动联系起来的简短讨论。Rimmington 的叙述值得仔细阅读，尤其是因为涉及大量个人、苏联研究工作和设施的名称多种多样且不断变化，以及所探索的历史的绝对复杂性。各种组织和细菌学首字母缩略词也促成了这种密度——缩写表对本书很有帮助。里明顿仅未能实现他所陈述的目标之一——展示斯大林的 BW 计划的潜力，即“揭示”现代国家可能如何秘密地从事类似活动（第 15 页）。2)——除了讨论政府极权控制（第 57 页）和安全失误（第 67-68 页）。撇开这一疏漏不谈，里明顿成功地将详细的重点放在了苏联生物武器研究的早期，突出了斯大林的作用，并解释了二战期间德苏在生物武器部署上的僵局（第 39-56 页、第 56-63 页） , 137–174)。最后，里明顿将叙述提前，以考虑后来的发展、斯大林的遗产，甚至当前的俄罗斯军事生物学研究。这篇报道虽然简短，但突出了二战后的发展（第 176-186 页）；科学和工业成就，包括据报道比美国或英国的非活疫苗更有效的活培养炭疽疫苗（第 187-202 页）；和斯大林在当前俄罗斯 BW 努力中的遗产（第 203-206 页）。Rimmington 观察到，除了苏联的进攻性武器计划外，斯大林的遗产仍然可以观察到。在他领导期间创建的几乎整个核心军事 BW 基础设施今天仍然存在。此外，斯大林在基洛夫、叶卡捷琳堡和谢尔盖耶夫镇建立的三个 BW 设施与 Stalinera 兽用炭疽疫苗设施一起保持“全面运行”（第 204-206 页）。对后来苏联 BW 活动的详细报道超出了 Rimmington 的书的范围，而且正如他所指出的那样，有据可查（第 1、205 页）。里明顿成功地将焦点转移到了苏联历史的早期阶段，检查了苏联生物战研究的支离破碎和反应性根源，并强调了类似的德国努力和斯大林本人所发挥的整体作用。经过深入研究，