The accessibility of the archives of the East German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit; MfS or Stasi) puts at the disposal of researchers not only a rich and valuable source: about the East German foreign intelligence service and secret police, but also, thanks to records of the Stasi’s foreign espionage activities, a wealth of information about intelligence services elsewhere—information that would not be available otherwise. Helmut Müller-Enbergs and Thomas Wegener Friis are therefore justified in saying that the opening of the MfS archives brought about “a revolution in intelligence history” (p. 7). They have edited an anthology that explores the potential of these archives to analyze the espionage activities undertaken by the Hauptverwaltung für Aufklärung (HVA) of the MfS outside the German Democratic Republic. Müller-Enbergs and Friis devote their introduction, accompanied by a note on the source material, to critical reflections on the epistemological difficulties connected with intelligence history research. They also note that even though the opening of the Stasi archives has led to extensive research about the ministry’s distasteful activities within East German borders, much less attention has been devoted to studying the HVA’s foreign espionage operations. Expressing puzzlement at this lack of attention to a crucial dimension of Cold War history, they intend to reduce that deficit with a series of “brief research sketches” (p. 12) that summarize, in multiple volumes, GDR intelligence activities abroad. This first volume (A–G, the sketches presented in alphabetical order by country) covers Albania to Great Britain. Most contributions are by the editors themselves, although two other scholars and one journalist provide further chapters on MfS espionage in ten countries and one city-state. The chapters usually focus on human intelligence efforts, describing which agents were operating under diplomatic or unofficial cover, employing statistical analysis where possible. The introduction could have done with a brief description of how the HVA was structured and how it worked. References to earlier work on Stasi foreign intelligence, such as John Schmeidel’s Stasi: Sword and Shield of the Party (London/New York: Routledge 2008), are missing. The opening contributions, on Albania, America, and Andorra, are all by MüllerEnbergs. He describes Albania as a center of gravity (p. 26) for East German intelligence. This chapter has an interesting section on the kinds of intelligence (political, economic-scientific, counterintelligence) that was yielded by the HVA’s efforts and their relative importance as measured by the number of resulting analyses. The America chapter includes discussion of HVA’s targeting of U.S. military bases in Europe. This chapter is more narrative in its attention to the agents and their attempts to penetrate the highest levels of the U.S. government, a goal the MfS failed to achieve, according to Müller-Enbergs. In a little over a single page, the almost nonexistent

中文翻译：

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DDR Spionage: Von Albanien bis Grossbritannien

东德国家安全部 (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit; MfS 或 Stasi) 档案的可访问性不仅为研究人员提供了丰富而宝贵的资源：关于东德外国情报机构和秘密警察，而且，多亏了斯塔西的外国间谍活动的记录，有关其他地方情报部门的大量信息——否则将无法获得的信息。因此，Helmut Müller-Enbergs 和 Thomas Wegener Friis 有理由说 MfS 档案的开放带来了“情报史上的一场革命”（第 7 页）。他们编辑了一本选集，探讨了这些档案的潜力，以分析德国民主共和国以外 MfS 的 Hauptverwaltung für Aufklärung (HVA) 进行的间谍活动。Müller-Enbergs 和 Friis 将他们的介绍以及对原始材料的注释用于对与情报历史研究相关的认识论困难的批判性反思。他们还指出，尽管史塔西档案的开放引发了对该部在东德境内令人反感的活动的广泛研究，但对研究 HVA 的外国间谍活动的关注却少得多。他们对冷战历史的一个关键维度缺乏关注表示困惑，他们打算通过一系列“简要研究草图”（第 12 页）来减少这种不足，这些草图在多卷书中总结了东德在国外的情报活动。第一卷（A-G，按国家/地区的字母顺序显示的草图）涵盖了阿尔巴尼亚到英国。尽管其他两位学者和一位记者提供了关于十个国家和一个城邦的 MfS 间谍活动的更多章节，但大多数贡献是由编辑自己完成的。这些章节通常侧重于人类情报工作，描述哪些特工在外交或非官方掩护下运作，并在可能的情况下使用统计分析。介绍可以通过简要描述 HVA 的结构和工作方式来完成。缺少对早期斯塔西外国情报工作的引用，例如约翰施梅德尔的斯塔西：党的剑与盾（伦敦/纽约：Routledge 2008）。阿尔巴尼亚、美国和安道尔的开场贡献均由 MüllerEnbergs 撰写。他将阿尔巴尼亚描述为东德情报的重心（第 26 页）。本章有一个有趣的部分，介绍了 HVA 的努力所产生的各种情报（政治、经济科学、反情报）以及它们的相对重要性（以结果分析的数量衡量）。美国章节包括对 HVA 以美国在欧洲的军事基地为目标的讨论。Müller-Enbergs 表示，本章更多地关注特工及其渗透美国政府最高层的企图，而 MfS 未能实现这一目标。在一个多一点的页面中，几乎不存在的 欧洲的军事基地。Müller-Enbergs 表示，本章更多地关注特工及其渗透美国政府最高层的企图，而 MfS 未能实现这一目标。在一页多一点的地方，几乎不存在的 欧洲的军事基地。Müller-Enbergs 表示，本章更多地关注特工及其渗透美国政府最高层的企图，而 MfS 未能实现这一目标。在一个多一点的页面中，几乎不存在的