But with John F. Kennedy and his emphasis on flexible response, that dominance ended—the principal difference being the idea that nuclear war “could not be won.” Nuclear capability was still crucial to U.S. defense, but air-atomic strategy did not allow for the range of options the Kennedy administration hoped to cultivate in response to a broad range of contingencies. Beyond late-period air-atomic strategy, as Kaplan identifies it, the Kennedy administration developed a perspective and set of policies that were increasingly antithetical to air-atomic strategy, ultimately eclipsing it altogether. In its place rose the concept of MAD, which presupposed that the likelihood of victory even at great cost was so low as to make consideration of nuclear war—and therefore of any policy suggesting strategic use of nuclear weapons, such as air-atomic strategy—ridiculous. The U.S. Air Force had integrated new weapons into old ideas, a sufficient arrangement for a short time but quickly eclipsed by technological change and political realities (pp. 162–183). With this, Kaplan’s argument reaches its logical conclusion. Clear and readable throughout, the book follows through on promises made at the beginning, exploring the background and specific details of a transition largely overlooked in the historiography. Casual readers may wonder why Kaplan spends considerable time examining the rise of airpower itself or may feel that he is meting out some sort of anachronistic judgment on the supporters of air-atomic strategy in the early years of the Cold War. He explores the rise of airpower because understanding it is crucial to understanding the air-atomic strategy that follows: Nuclear weapons were inserted into an already existing strategic mindset that Air Force personnel saw as successful and valid. Kaplan offers a convincing judgment in his conclusion, stating that “responsible men made good decisions about hard issues. They were not cavemen, and they were not wrong. They did their duty by creating the most lethal military force in history. They succeeded because it never had to be used” (p. 223). All told, Kaplan presents a thorough, compelling, masterfully woven, and well-researched history of U.S. airatomic strategy during the Cold War.

中文翻译：

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革命圣地：阿尔及利亚、非殖民化和第三世界秩序

但随着约翰·肯尼迪和他对灵活反应的强调，这种主导地位结束了——主要的区别在于核战争“无法获胜”的想法。核能力对美国国防仍然至关重要，但空原子战略不允许肯尼迪政府希望为应对各种突发事件而制定的一系列选项。除了后期空原子战略之外，正如卡普兰所指出的那样，肯尼迪政府制定了一种观点和一系列政策，这些观点和政策越来越与空原子战略背道而驰，最终完全使之黯然失色。取而代之的是 MAD 的概念，它的前提是即使付出巨大代价也能取得胜利的可能性很低，以至于要考虑核战争——因此任何建议战略性使用核武器的政策，比如空原子战略——荒谬。美国空军已将新武器融入旧思想，这种安排在短时间内就足够了，但很快就被技术变革和政治现实所掩盖（第 162-183 页）。这样，卡普兰的论点就得出了合乎逻辑的结论。这本书通篇清晰易读，贯彻了开头的承诺，探索了在历史编纂中很大程度上被忽视的过渡的背景和具体细节。普通读者可能想知道为什么卡普兰要花大量时间研究空中力量本身的崛起，或者可能会觉得他对冷战初期空中原子战略的支持者做出了某种不合时宜的判断。他探讨了空中力量的崛起，因为理解它对于理解以下空中原子战略至关重要：核武器被插入到空军人员认为成功和有效的现有战略思维中。卡普兰在他的结论中提供了一个令人信服的判断，指出“负责任的人对困难的问题做出了正确的决定。他们不是穴居人，他们也没有错。他们通过创建历史上最致命的军事力量来履行自己的职责。他们成功了，因为它从未被使用过”（第 223 页）。总而言之，卡普兰展示了冷战期间美国航空原子战略的详尽、引人入胜、巧妙编织和深入研究的历史。他们没有错。他们通过创建历史上最致命的军事力量来履行自己的职责。他们成功了，因为它从未被使用过”（第 223 页）。总而言之，卡普兰展示了冷战期间美国航空原子战略的详尽、引人入胜、巧妙编织和深入研究的历史。他们没有错。他们通过创建历史上最致命的军事力量来履行自己的职责。他们之所以成功，是因为它从未被使用过”（第 223 页）。总而言之，卡普兰展示了冷战期间美国航空原子战略的详尽、引人入胜、巧妙编织和深入研究的历史。