Abstract The article builds on James Morrow’s theoretical formulation on asymmetric alliances, which contends that alliances are formed as a result of a security–autonomy trade-off between great powers and minor powers. It expands Morrow’s theory by showing that in the absence of a common threat or shared interests, the trade-off tends to leave a deficit in a weaker state’s net benefits from the alliance. I argue that side payments fill in the deficit in gains for weaker states. The article highlights the importance of domestic political constraints in shaping leaders’ alliance policies. I use the US–Pakistan alliance as a case study to probe the argument. The analysis presented here shows that the alliance, formed in 1954, was a result of a strategic trade-off between the United States and Pakistan. The case provides support to the argument that side payments played a crucial role in cementing the alliance.

中文翻译：

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边际支付在形成不对称联盟中的作用：打造美巴联盟

摘要 本文建立在詹姆斯·莫罗关于不对称联盟的理论表述之上，该表述认为联盟是大国和小国之间安全-自治权衡的结果。它扩展了莫罗的理论，表明在没有共同威胁或共同利益的情况下，权衡往往会导致较弱国家从联盟中获得的净收益出现赤字。我认为边际支付填补了较弱国家的收益赤字。文章强调了国内政治约束在塑造领导人联盟政策方面的重要性。我以美巴联盟为例来探讨这个论点。此处提供的分析表明，该联盟成立于 1954 年，是美国和巴基斯坦之间战略权衡的结果。