In this paper, I criticize two recent and influential arguments for no-platforming advanced by Robert Simpson and Amia Srinivasan and by Neil Levy, respectively. What both arguments have in common is their attempt to reconcile no-platforming with liberal values. For Simpson and Srinivasan, no-platforming does not contradict liberalism if grounded on the distinction between norms of free speech and norms of academic freedom; for Levy, those who defend the practice need not be accused of promoting paternalism. I argue that neither view succeeds: these authors’ views are in strong tension with core tenets of liberalism. I proceed as follows: after introducing some basic liberal principles, I explain Simpson and Srinivasan’s argument in more detail and argue that it is too strong for some their stated purposes; then I proceed to show that both Simpson and Srinivasan and Levy’s arguments would justify extremely closed universities; finally, after arguing that Levy’s stance does not circumvent paternalism, I present some evidence that no-platforming would be captured by censors and probably threaten the very academic freedom that the authors want to protect.

在本文中，我分别批评了 Robert Simpson 和 Amia Srinivasan 以及 Neil Levy 提出的关于无平台化的两个最近且有影响力的论点。这两个论点的共同点是他们试图调和非平台化与自由主义价值观。对于辛普森和斯里尼瓦桑来说，如果基于言论自由规范和学术自由规范之间的区别，无平台并不与自由主义相矛盾；对于利维来说，那些为这种做法辩护的人不必被指责提倡家长式作风。我认为这两种观点都不成功：这些作者的观点与自由主义的核心信条存在强烈的张力。我继续如下：在介绍了一些基本的自由主义原则之后，我更详细地解释了 Simpson 和 Srinivasan 的论点，并认为它对于他们陈述的某些目的来说过于强大；然后我继续证明 Simpson 和 Srinivasan 以及 Levy 的论点都可以证明极端封闭的大学是合理的；最后，在论证 Levy 的立场并没有规避家长作风之后，我提出了一些证据，证明无平台化会被审查者捕获，并且可能威胁到作者想要保护的学术自由。