Recent work in social epistemology has shown that, in certain situations, less communication leads to better outcomes for epistemic groups. In this paper, we show that, ceteris paribus, a Bayesian agent may believe less strongly that a single agent is biased than that an entire group of independent agents is biased. We explain this initially surprising result and show that it is in fact a consequence one may conceive on the basis of commonsense reasoning.

中文翻译：

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关于代理人偏见的评估强度

最近在社会认识论方面的工作表明，在某些情况下，较少的交流会为认知群体带来更好的结果。在本文中，我们表明，在其他条件不变的情况下，贝叶斯代理可能不太相信单个代理有偏见，而不是整个独立代理组有偏见。我们解释了这一最初令人惊讶的结果，并表明它实际上是人们根据常识推理可能会想到的结果。