In this paper, we will explore one way in which understanding can—and, we will argue, should—be valuable. We will do this by drawing on what has been said (primarily in Pritchard et al.: The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) about the different ways knowledge can be valuable. Our main contribution will be to identify one heretofore undiscussed way knowledge could be valuable, but isn’t—specifically, having value to someone other than the understander. We suggest that it is a desideratum on an account of understanding that understanding have the specified type of value; our basis for this claim will come from recent work in cognitive psychology. This desideratum can then be used to measure the success of various accounts of understanding. We argue that accounts of understanding that have a particular structure will predict (and perhaps explain) why understanding has that sort of value. For good measure, we then engage in a bit of a literature review, investigating which extant accounts of understanding satisfy this desideratum (spoiler: some do and some don’t).

中文翻译：

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了解招聘

在本文中，我们将探索一种理解可以——而且我们将论证，应该——有价值的方式。我们将利用关于知识价值的不同方式（主要在 Pritchard 等人：知识的性质和价值：三项调查，牛津大学出版社，牛津，2010 年）中所说的来做到这一点。我们的主要贡献将是确定一种迄今为止尚未讨论过的知识可能有价值的方式，但不是——具体来说，对理解者以外的其他人有价值。我们建议，由于理解具有特定类型的价值，因此需要这样做；我们这一主张的基础将来自最近在认知心理学方面的工作。然后可以使用这种需求来衡量各种理解解释的成功与否。我们认为，具有特定结构的理解说明将预测（并可能解释）为什么理解具有这种价值。为了更好地衡量，我们然后进行了一些文献回顾，调查哪些现存的理解解释满足了这一需求（剧透：有些可以，有些不可以）。