The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (J Gen Philos Sci 49(3):451–459, 2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park in J Gen Philos Sci 48(4):569–579, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén in Stud Hist Philos Sci 56(72):82, 2016). I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.

中文翻译：

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科学理解、虚构理解和科学进步

认知论和理性论分别认为科学进步的本质是知识和理解的增加。Dellsén (J Gen Philos Sci 49(3):451–459, 2018) 批评认知论 (Park in J Gen Philos Sci 48(4):569–579, 2017a) 并捍卫理性论 (Dellsén in Stud Hist Philos科学 56(72):82, 2016)。我认为戴尔森对认识论的批评是失败的，而且他声称不需要信仰也不需要理由的理解概念不能解释科学进步，尽管它可以解释科幻小说中的虚构进步。