In many wars, fighting allows states to hold onto some of the disputed good until the conflict is over. Indeed, war may look attractive to some actors for that purpose even if they will likely lose and incur substantial costs in the process. How does this incentive to stall alter the likelihood of conflict onset? We develop a model in which a delay exists between war’s initiation and termination. During that time, states maintain a division of the disputed good. If states value the future at different rates, no mutually preferable settlement may exist. War is more likely when a more patient state is powerful but holds a smaller share during the dispute. In addition, we show the parameters for war are non-monotonic in the length of conflict: fighting only occurs when the delay falls in a middle range. ∗We thank Hein Goemans, Laura Paler, Michael Poznansky, Kris Ramsay, and Brad Smith, the anonymous reviewers, and the editors of International Studies Quarterly for helpful comments and suggestions. †Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Posvar Hall 4446, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. (williamspaniel@gmail.com, http://williamspaniel.com). ‡Department of Politics, Princeton University, Fisher Hall 312, Princeton, NJ 08540. (phbils@gmail.com, http://peterbils.com). §Department of Politics, Princeton University, Fisher Hall 313, Princeton, NJ 08540. (gleason.judd@princeton.edu, http://gleasonjudd.com). The Sri Lankan Civil War began in 1983 when the Tamil Tigers tried to create a breakaway state. Conflict raged for a quarter century. From one perspective, the Tamil Tigers failed—the Sri Lankan government eventually defeated the uprising. But from another perspective, the war was a success. For more than two decades, the Tigers held territorial sovereignty over Tamil Eelam. At its peak, the de facto state had a capital in Kilinochchi, a functioning court system, and ran the Bank of Tiger Eelam. The Tamil Tigers achieved—at least temporarily—some of their aims by fighting. Conflict may have been costly, and defeat likely, but the Tamil Tigers nevertheless enjoyed their intrabellum circumstances. The Tamil Tigers’ experience is not unique. Throughout history, wars have featured one side stalling to maintain some benefit. This goes back to Rome’s surrounding of Carthage during the Third Punic War, and it became commonplace during the Medieval era. To this day, civil wars often extend decades. The United States in particular has participated in many protracted conflicts since the September 11th attacks. What makes a state willing to fight a war to stall? To answer this question, we analyze a model of bargaining and conflict. We find that two key features of the dyadic relationship make states more inclined to stall: (i) conflict is not expected to resolve immediately nor drag on indeterminately, and (ii) the wartime distribution of goods differs substantially from the expected post-war distribution. If either condition fails, however, then states settle peacefully for reasons analogous to standard crisis bargaining. Indeed, as point (i) suggests, if a side can maintain the intrabellum share indefinitely, then states would peacefully resolve the dispute. Thus, explaining stalling wars requires more than simply arguing that such conflicts arise from one side fighting to maintain a favorable distribution. To generate these insights, we build on the standard bargaining model in two ways. First, we assume there is delay between conflict initiation and resolution. The aforementioned intrabellum distribution therefore plays an important role: during war, each state enjoys a share of the disputed good. Second, we allow actors to have different discount factors. Relaxing either assumption in isolation results in peace, but war is possible when they are combined. The intuition is as follows. Consider a militarily weak and impatient state that holds a disproportionate share of the disputed good during conflict. Peaceful settlements must give this state a large share of the good, despite its weakness, because it can fight to stall and enjoy its wartime share. Although the state will likely lose in the long run, it does not care because it is impatient. Now, consider the more patient state. It also requires a large share of any peaceful

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失速战争：国家何时才能保持现状？*

在许多战争中，战斗使国家能够保留一些有争议的物品，直到冲突结束。的确，为此目的，战争可能对某些行为者似乎很有吸引力，即使他们可能会为此损失并招致大量费用。这种失速诱因如何改变冲突发作的可能性？我们建立了一个模型，其中战争的开始和结束之间存在延迟。在此期间，各州对有争议的货物进行分割。如果各州以不同的速度对未来进行估价，那么可能不会存在相互可取的解决方案。当有更多耐心的国家强大但在争端期间所占份额较小时，战争更有可能发生。此外，我们显示战争的参数在冲突期间不是单调的：战斗仅在延迟处于中间范围时发生。∗我们感谢Hein Goemans，Laura Paler，匿名评论家，《国际研究季刊》的编辑Michael Poznansky，Kris Ramsay和Brad Smith提出了有益的意见和建议。†匹兹堡大学政治科学系，宾夕法尼亚州匹兹堡Posvar Hall 4446，宾夕法尼亚州15260。（williamspaniel @ gmail.com，http：//williamspaniel.com）。‡普林斯顿大学政治学系，新泽西州普林斯顿，费舍厅312号，邮编08540。（phbils @ gmail.com，http：//peterbils.com）。§普林斯顿大学政治系，新泽西州普林斯顿，费希尔大厅313号，邮编08540。（gleason.judd @ princeton.edu，http：//gleasonjudd.com）。斯里兰卡内战始于1983年，当时泰米尔猛虎组织试图建立一个脱离国家。冲突肆虐了四分之一世纪。从一个角度看，泰米尔猛虎组织失败了，斯里兰卡政府最终击败了起义。但是从另一个角度来看，战争取得了成功。在超过二十年的时间里，猛虎组织对泰米尔伊拉姆拥有领土主权。事实上的州在顶峰时期在运作正常的法院系统基里诺奇（Kilinochchi）拥有一个首都，并经营着老虎伊拉姆银行（Bank of Tiger Eelam）。泰米尔猛虎组织通过战斗至少部分地实现了一些目标。冲突的代价可能很高，很可能会失败，但泰米尔猛虎组织仍然享受着自己的战场环境。泰米尔猛虎组织的经历并非独一无二。纵观历史，战争一直以一方拖延为特征，以保持一定的利益。这可以追溯到第三次布匿战争期间罗马包围的迦太基，并在中世纪时代变得司空见惯。直到今天，内战常常持续数十年。自9月11日袭击以来，特别是美国参加了许多旷日持久的冲突。是什么让一个国家愿意打一场战争来阻止它？为了回答这个问题，我们分析了讨价还价和冲突的模型。我们发现，二元关系的两个主要特征使国家更倾向于停滞不前：（i）冲突不会立即解决也不会无限期拖延；（ii）战时货物的分配与战后预期的分配有很大不同。但是，如果任何一个条件失败，则各州出于类似于标准危机谈判的理由而和平解决。确实，正如第（i）点所暗示的那样，如果一方可以无限期地维持军团内部份额，那么各国将和平解决争端。因此，解释失速战争不仅需要简单地争辩说，这种冲突源于为维持有利分配而进行的单方面战斗。为了产生这些见解，我们通过两种方式建立在标准议价模型上。首先，我们假设冲突开始和解决之间存在延迟。因此，前述的内部包容性分配起着重要的作用：在战争期间，每个州都享有有争议的利益。其次，我们允许参与者具有不同的折现因子。孤立地放宽任何一个假设都可以带来和平，但是将它们结合起来就有可能发生战争。直觉如下。考虑一下一个军事弱点和不耐烦的状态，在冲突期间该状态在有争议的货物中占有不成比例的份额。尽管该国处于弱势地位，但和平解决方案必须给该国带来很大的好处，因为它可以为失速而战，并享有其战时份额。尽管从长远来看该状态可能会失败，但它并不在乎，因为它很急。现在，考虑更耐心的状态。它还需要很大一部分和平