The logic of “risk” is increasingly important in the study of global health politics. One recent contribution has even argued that risk is beginning to replace security as the defining logic of health governance and policy. Others dispute this on the basis that risk and security have always operated together in the “securitization” of disease. This article constitutes a theoretical intervention into this burgeoning debate. Does a stronger appreciation of risk warrant the diminishment of security? Are we looking at the “riskification” of health rather than “securitization”? Or would this miss the way these two logics might be complimentary or intertwined in ways that we are yet to theorize? I argue that the global health and securitization literatures are better served by an explicit consideration of risk and security logics in interplay, or never entirely encompassed by the other, nor in complete alignment, yet never truly separate. To do this, I propose a reconceptualization of the central problem—exceptionalism—that allows for risk to be understood as a form of exceptionalist politics. I demonstrate the validity of this approach through an otherwise “easy case” of securitization: the US response to the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa.

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从威胁到风险？卫生保健的例外论与逻辑

在全球卫生政治研究中，“风险”的逻辑越来越重要。最近的一项贡献甚至认为，风险已开始取代安全性，将其作为卫生治理和政策的定义逻辑。其他人则以风险和安全在疾病“安全化”中始终共同作用为基础提出了质疑。本文构成了对这一新兴辩论的理论干预。增强风险认识是否会降低安全性？我们是在关注健康的“风险化”，而不是“安全化”吗？还是会错过这两种逻辑可能以我们尚未理论化的方式互补或交织的方式？我认为，通过明确考虑相互作用中的风险和安全逻辑，可以更好地为全球健康和证券化文献服务，或从未完全被对方包围，也从未完全对齐，但从未真正分开。为此，我建议对中心问题（例外主义）进行重新概念化，使风险可以理解为一种例外主义政治形式。我通过证券化的另外一个“简单案例”证明了这种方法的有效性：美国对2014-2016年西非埃博拉疫情的反应。