Under what conditions do court rulings generate improved human rights outcomes? In this paper, we investigate the extent to which court-ordered accountability institutions can decrease government repression in the form of police violence. We argue that the creation of court-ordered, regional bodies to which citizens can report allegations of police abuse provides “fire-alarm” oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) by which police officers can be monitored—and potentially held accountable—for abuses of power. To test the implications of our theory, we take advantage of variance in the implementation of Prakash Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors, a 2006 judgment by the Supreme Court of India requiring states and districts to establish local Police Complaints Authorities (PCAs). Using a quasiexperimental difference-in-difference design, we show that the implementation of state PCAs is associated with statistically and substantively significant decreases in human rights violations by Indian police officers. ∗Paper prepared for presentation at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA. †Graduate Student in Political Science. Email: shu8@ucmerced.edu ‡Associate Professor of Political Science. Email: cconrad2@ucmerced.edu

中文翻译：

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通过法院进行监督：印度的司法监督和警察暴力

法院的裁决在什么条件下可以改善人权结果？在本文中，我们调查了法院命令的问责制机构在多大程度上可以减少警察暴力形式的政府镇压。我们认为，建立法院下令的区域机构，使公民可以向其报告关于警察滥用职权的指控，提供了“火警”监督（McCubbins和Schwartz 1984），可以对警察进行监督，并可能追究其滥用职权的责任。力量。为了检验我们理论的含义，我们在Prakash Singh和Ors的实现中利用了方差。v。印度和奥尔斯联盟（Union of India and Ors），印度最高法院2006年的一项判决，要求各州和地区建立当地的警察投诉当局（PCA）。使用准实验的差异设计 我们表明，实施国家PCA与印度警官在统计上和实质上大幅减少侵犯人权行为有关。∗论文准备在美国加利福尼亚州旧金山市的西方政治科学协会2018年年会上发表。†政治学研究生。电子邮件：shu8@ucmerced.edu‡政治学副教授。电子邮件：cconrad2@ucmerced.edu