One goal of the law is to provide a means to return disputing parties to cooperation. The prevailing expectation is that international investment law largely does not do this; rather, an aggrieved foreign investor sues the host state as a last resort and divests. I use a new database of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) arbitrations and firm-level bilateral investment to show that, in fact, claimant investors reinvest in the host state at least 31 percent of the time (between 1990 and 2015). Among investors who file for arbitration, and controlling for sector, important correlates of reinvestment include the claimant's legal strategy; the extent of the claimant's grievance and success; and the incidence of post-arbitration litigation. Despite unique aspects of its institutional design, the de facto international investment regime can help solve host state time-inconsistency problems consistent with standard expectations of law. Whether the probability of reinvestment is high enough to reinforce host state commitments to this controversial regime is an open question.

中文翻译：

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国际投资法和外国直接再投资

该法律的一个目标是提供一种使争议方恢复合作的手段。普遍的期望是国际投资法在很大程度上没有这样做；相反，受害的外国投资者作为最后手段起诉东道国并撤资。我使用了一个新的投资者-国家争端解决 (ISDS) 仲裁和公司层面的双边投资数据库来表明，事实上，申请人投资者在东道国进行再投资的概率至少为 31%（从 1990 年到 2015 年）。在申请仲裁和控制部门的投资者中，再投资的重要相关因素包括申请人的法律策略；索赔人的申诉和成功的程度；以及仲裁后诉讼的发生率。尽管其制度设计有独特的方面，事实上的国际投资制度可以帮助解决东道国的时间不一致问题，符合法律的标准预期。再投资的可能性是否高到足以加强东道国对这一有争议的制度的承诺是一个悬而未决的问题。