Many theories of international relations assume that public opinion exerts a powerful effect on foreign policy in democracies. Previous research, based on observational data, has reached conflicting conclusions about this foundational assumption. We use experiments to examine two mechanisms—responsiveness and selection—through which opinion could shape decisions about the use of military force. We tested responsiveness by asking members of the Israeli parliament to consider a crisis in which we randomized information about public opinion. Parliamentarians were more willing to use military force when the public was in favor and believed that contravening public opinion would entail heavy political costs. We tested selection by asking citizens in Israel and the US to evaluate parties/candidates, which varied randomly on many dimensions. In both countries, security policy proved as electorally significant as economic and religious policy, and far more consequential than nonpolicy considerations such as gender, race, and experience. Overall, our experiments in two important democracies imply that citizens can affect policy by incentivizing incumbents and shaping who gets elected.

中文翻译：

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民主国家关于军事力量的舆论和决定

许多国际关系理论假设舆论对民主国家的外交政策产生强大影响。先前基于观测数据的研究对这一基本假设得出了相互矛盾的结论。我们使用实验来检验两种机制——反应和选择——通过这些机制，意见可以影响关于使用军事力量的决定。我们通过要求以色列议会成员考虑一场危机来测试响应能力，在该危机中，我们随机分配了有关公众舆论的信息。当公众赞成时，议员们更愿意使用武力，并认为违背公众舆论会带来沉重的政治代价。我们通过要求以色列和美国的公民评估政党/候选人来测试选择，这些政党/候选人在许多方面随机变化。在这两个国家，安全政策被证明与经济和宗教政策一样具有选举意义，并且比性别、种族和经验等非政策因素更为重要。Overall, our experiments in two important democracies imply that citizens can affect policy by incentivizing incumbents and shaping who gets elected.