The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance of French companies.,This study used 385 firm-year observations drawn from a sample of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index from 2008 to 2012. Data was collected from annual reports of sample companies. To measure earnings management, this study used the model of Raman and Shahrur (2008). The relationship between shareholder activism, earnings management and market performance using the panel data regression model was empirically examined.,The results prove that shareholder activism, as indicated by shareholder proposals, has no impact on market performance. However, the existence of shareholder activism affects the market performance positively. In fact, a minimum of proposals proves that shareholder activism plays an appropriate and effective role in creating value. Thus, several activists would resort to “a private activism” which could be the best and the least expensive form. This form of activism is called “behind the scenes.” Findings also show that earnings management has a negative impact on market performance. As a matter of fact, these findings allow to conclude that the firm performance decreases whenever managers undertake to earnings management. Also, earnings management behavior is mainly opportunistic. Finally, the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management has no impact on market performance. This result reveals that shareholder activism proves to be an ineffective mechanism that does not alter the accounting choices, particularly in relation to earnings management. This result shows the inability of active shareholders to define and implement strategies across their proposals, namely, “the lack of monitoring competence.”,It is important in future research to evaluate the impact of behind the scenes interventions on corporate governance. Also, this paper gives a larger dimension to the effect of shareholder activism on the market performance in the specific context of earnings management, thus justifying the need to expand this study using other methodologies to deepen and better understand this relationship in this context.,The paper's evidence contributes to an understanding of corporate governance. The finding of this study will help in monitoring and controlling fraudulent earnings management practices that effect on market performance. Further, this study is important to investors, academics and policymakers, as it demonstrates that governance reforms that encourage firms to adopt better governance practices that reduce the likelihood of earnings management.,To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper pioneers in focusing on the impact of the shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance because previous studies put more emphasis on pair-wise relations (Shareholder activism-earnings management, earnings management-market performance and shareholder activism-market performance). This study provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on market performance.

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股东积极性，盈余管理和市场绩效后果：法国案例

这项研究的目的是调查股东积极性与收益管理之间的关系对法国公司的市场绩效的影响。该研究使用了385个公司年观察值，这些观察值是从SBF 120指数的法国公司样本中得出的。 2008年至2012年。数据是从样本公司的年度报告中收集的。为了衡量盈余管理，本研究使用了Raman和Shahrur（2008）的模型。使用面板数据回归模型对股东积极性，收益管理和市场绩效之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果证明，股东提议所表明的股东积极性对市场绩效没有影响。但是，股东积极主义的存在对市场表现产生了积极影响。实际上，最少的提议证明，股东积极性在创造价值中起着适当而有效的作用。因此，一些激进主义者会求助于“私人激进主义”，这可能是最好和最便宜的形式。这种行动主义形式被称为“幕后”。研究结果还表明，盈余管理对市场表现有负面影响。实际上，这些发现可以得出结论，只要经理进行盈余管理，公司的绩效就会下降。此外，盈余管理行为主要是机会主义的。最后，股东积极性与收益管理之间的关系对市场表现没有影响。这一结果表明，股东积极主义被证明是一种无效的机制，不会改变会计选择，特别是在收益管理方面。该结果表明，积极股东无法在其提案中定义和实施战略，即“缺乏监督能力”。在未来的研究中，评估幕后干预对公司治理的影响非常重要。同样，本文在收益管理的特定背景下，从更大程度上探讨了股东积极主义对市场绩效的影响，因此有必要使用其他方法来扩大本研究，以加深和更好地理解这种背景下的这种关系。论文的证据有助于对公司治理的理解。这项研究的发现将有助于监视和控制影响市场绩效的欺诈性收益管理做法。进一步，这项研究对投资者，学者和政策制定者很重要，因为它表明了鼓励企业采用更好的治理实践的治理改革，可以减少收益管理的可能性。据作者所知，本文率先研究了影响股东积极主义和收益管理对市场绩效的影响，因为先前的研究更加强调了成对关系（股东积极主义-收益管理，收益管理-市场绩效和股东积极主义-市场绩效）。这项研究提供了关于股东积极性与收益管理之间的关系对市场绩效的有效性的经验证据。因为它表明治理改革鼓励公司采用更好的治理实践，从而减少了收益管理的可能性。据作者所知，本文率先着重研究了股东积极主义和收益管理对市场绩效的影响因为以前的研究更加注重两两关系（股东行动主义-收益管理，收益管理-市场绩效和股东行动主义-市场绩效）。这项研究提供了关于股东积极性与收益管理之间的关系对市场绩效的有效性的经验证据。因为它表明治理改革鼓励公司采用更好的治理实践，从而减少了收益管理的可能性。据作者所知，本文率先着重研究了股东积极主义和收益管理对市场绩效的影响因为以前的研究更加注重两两关系（股东行动主义-收益管理，收益管理-市场绩效和股东行动主义-市场绩效）。这项研究提供了关于股东积极性与收益管理之间的关系对市场绩效的有效性的经验证据。由于先前的研究更加强调了成对关系（股东维权-盈余管理，盈余管理-市场绩效和股东维权-市场绩效），因此本文率先聚焦于股东积极主义和收益管理对市场绩效的影响。这项研究提供了关于股东积极性与收益管理之间的关系对市场绩效的有效性的经验证据。由于先前的研究更加强调了成对关系（股东维权-盈余管理，盈余管理-市场绩效和股东维权-市场绩效），因此本文率先聚焦于股东积极主义和收益管理对市场绩效的影响。这项研究提供了关于股东积极性与收益管理之间的关系对市场绩效有效性的经验证据。